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Chapter One - Introduction 
‘A history of unaddressed massive abuses is likely to be socially divisive, to generate mistrust 
between groups and in the institutions of the State, and to hamper or slow down the 
achievement of security and development goals. It raises questions about the commitment to 
the rule of law and, ultimately, can lead to cyclical recurrence of violence in various forms.’ 
      -International Centre for Transitional Justice1 
1.1 Problem Statement 
This paper analyses how Nigeria has dealt with the massive violation of human rights abuses 
of successive military regimes in the past, with specific focus on prosecutions and 
reparations. During the Nigerian transition, a few prosecutions were initiated subsequent to 
end of the military regime but only one has been successfully sustained to the point of 
judgment which has been, subsequently reserved on appeal. Reparative steps were also taken 
with respect to victims in the Niger-Delta Region of the country. Does this portend a tinge of 
or rather fleeting hope for victims of state sponsored violence in Nigeria? Should, in fact, 
further measures be employed to redress the repression of the past military regimes? 
Transition from repressive and authoritarian government to democracy became a growing 
phenomenon at the end of the Cold War and in this context, the concept of transitional justice 
gained increased prominence at the international level.
2
 In many of the authoritarian regimes, 
the commission of gross violations of human rights was a common feature. Thus, at the point 
of transition, each state is confronted with questions on how to reckon with the human rights 
violations of the past and effectively achieve justice for the victims of such violations. Such 
challenges as to identifying the perpetrators of the massive human rights abuses of the past 
regimes, deciding what to do with them (prosecuting or granting amnesty), reckoning with 
                                                 
1
 ICTJ Why is Transitional Justice Important? Available at http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice (accessed 
October 2013). 
2
 Roht-Arriaza N ‘The New Landscape of Transitional Justice’ in Roht-Arriaza N & Mariezcurrena J 
Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century (2006) 2-3.  
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the evil deeds of the past and helping victims to overcome the past are pertinent among 
others.
3
 
The response of a state to the legacies of its past usually depends on the aims it seeks to 
achieve and the context of transition. A state 
‘[may decide to] punish perpetrators of violent and repressive acts, establish the truth, 
repair or address damages, pay respect to victims, promote national reconciliation, 
reduce conflict over the past and prevent further abuses in the future. It may even 
desire to gain the favour of the international community’.4 
Transitional justice proposes measures to redress victims of repression and massive violation 
of human rights by a state in the past, as result of authoritarian regimes or internal armed 
conflict. 
One of the hallmarks of military regimes in Nigeria and indeed military regimes in several 
parts of the African continent is massive violation of human rights. These military regimes 
were known for repression, torture and systematic killing of political opponents and other 
forms of massive violation of human rights, suppression of the press, corruption and money 
laundering, among other ills. In Nigeria, the Abacha regime, which was the last before 
transition to democracy, marked the height of military repression. The political transition in 
Nigeria to a democratic rule after fifteen years of successive military regimes sets the right 
circumstances for the engagement of transitional justice measures. 
This research paper focuses on the subject of transitional justice against the political 
background of military regimes in Nigeria. Even though Nigeria has been democratically 
                                                 
3
 These questions are not only peculiar to transitions after repressive regimes but generally applicable to post-
conflict situations. 
4
 Hayner P  Unspeakable Truths – facing the challenges of truth commissions (2002) 11. 
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governed since 1999, there are contentions that the repressions experienced in the country 
during successive military regimes have not been thoroughly addressed. As a result, the 
political landscape of the country remains quite unstable. This is the background that informs 
the research questions this study seeks to examine. 
1.2 Significance of Problem 
Transitional justice measures as employed in different jurisdictions range from the conviction 
of the Argentine junta leaders for their roles in crimes committed during the 1970’s and the 
1980’s5 and the prosecution of East Germany border guards after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the unification in the early 90’s,6 to broad amnesty in Chile7, lustrations in the Czech 
Republic and Poland
8
 and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. 
Thus, the concept of transitional justice proposes both retributive and restorative forms of 
justice, while the retributive form focuses on bringing perpetrators to account for human 
rights violations, restorative justice is focused on ‘repairing the harm’ done to the victims. 
This study is drawn against the background of the human rights abuses of successive military 
regimes in Nigeria until 1999. Successive democratic administrations made attempts to 
redress the repression and violations orchestrated by these military regimes. One prominent 
                                                 
5
 The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about a wave of democratisation which swept around the continents 
of the world especially in Eastern Europe and Central America. This brought about significant phase of the 
subject of transitional justice in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The scope of transitional justice was broadened 
to include a shift from the international model of seeking justice for repressive acts of the past to domestic 
means of redress. This was particularly exemplified in the collapse of repressive military junta in Argentina after 
the Falklands /Malvinas War which transited the country to a democratic rule. 
6
 The unification of East and West Germany brought about the need to prosecute crimes committed in East 
Germany before the unification. Prominent among the trials is the trial of border guards responsible for killing 
East German citizens attempting to flee to West Germany. 
7
 In Chile, after the repressive military regime of Pinochet, blanket amnesty was granted to perpetrators of 
human rights abuses in the past regime. 
8
 The Czech Republic and Poland adopted lustration laws as a transitional justice measure in place of trials. In 
Czech Republic after a transition from communism to democratic rule, Public officers who had been involved 
with the Communist Secret Police were blacklisted from holding public office as a deterrent measure. In Poland, 
lustration was used as a policy to limit the participation of former communists and informant for the communist 
secret police informants in the civil service of the country as well as in government. 
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attempt made by the democratic government is the establishment of the Human Rights 
Violations Investigation Commission (HRVIC) in 1999 as a truth commission model in 
Nigeria. The HRVIC recorded relatively little success in its work and barely a little more than 
nothing was achieved with respect to national prosecutions in accounting for the atrocities of 
the military regimes.  
It is the thrust of this paper that given the challenges and shortcomings of the measures thus 
far adopted, marked by the work of the HRVIC and few attempted prosecutions and 
reparations, there is the need to further employ transitional justice mechanisms to fully 
address the atrocities of the past. This is important in order to forestall the prevailing threat 
towards a repetition of the history of the repressive attitude of the past military regimes. 
1.3 Research Questions 
In the light of the repressive acts of the past military regimes, this paper examines the 
question: How has Nigeria dealt with the legacies of repression and massive abuse of human 
rights of the past successive military regimes in whole? Flowing from that question, other 
questions to be examined include the following: 
 Which measures were taken by the new Nigerian government to address the human 
rights violations committed during the previous military regimes? 
 How effective were the measures adopted so far taking into consideration the 
Nigerian context? 
 Could more reparations and prosecutions address the shortcomings of these measures? 
Overall, the study considers the significance of the Nigerian transitional justice model to the 
field of transitional justice in general. 
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1.4 Literature Review 
Generally, there are a number of scholarly works in the field of transitional justice in 
general.
9
 Presently, there are, however, only a few chapters and articles which specifically 
discuss transitional justice in the context of the Nigerian post-military era. 
Yusuf and Kukah
10
 focus on the challenges and the limitation of the work of the commission 
of the HRVIC. They conclude that the commission did not achieve as much as what was 
expected of it and this stemmed from the basis of its operation. The legality of the 
commission had not been properly settled and its mandate was too narrow to effectively 
cover areas of human rights abuses by the past military regimes. 
This paper, while acknowledging the work of the authors with respect to the work of the 
HRVIC, examines transitional justice process in Nigeria in the light of the aftermath of the 
work of the HRVIC. In addition, the authors’ focus on the work of the HRVIC leaves room 
for more research in other areas of transitional justice in the Nigerian context. None of the 
authors, for instance, considered the question of reparations or prosecutions as transitional 
justice measures applicable to the Nigerian context. 
In the light of the above, this work attempts to contribute to the available literature on the 
topic of transitional justice with specific focus on the Nigerian model weighing the efficacy 
of the mechanisms adopted by the Nigerian post transition government. 
                                                 
9
 Such literature include Teitel R  Transitional Justice (2000) Kritz N J (ed) Transitional Justice- How Emerging 
Democracies reckon With Former Regimes I (1995) Olsen T D Payne L A & Reiter A G Transitional Justice in 
Balance, Comparing processes, weighing efficacy (2010). 
10
 Yusuf H Travails of Truth: Achieving Justice for Victims of Impunity in Nigeria (2007); Kukah M ‘Peace 
Versus Justice? A view from Nigeria’ in Sriram C L &Pillay S (eds) Peace Versus Justice? The Dilemma of 
Transitional Justice in Africa (2009). 
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1.5 Argument 
This paper will show that Nigeria did not just emerge from several decades of repressive 
military regime without making an attempt to deal with the gross human rights abuses of the 
past. However, in the light of the historical political background, the measures adopted by 
Nigeria in confronting the past have not adequately dealt with the legacies of the military 
regimes. Prosecutions were highly selective and reparations did not focus on the victims as 
such. 
Thus this study, after thoroughly scrutinising the measures taken so far by the Nigerian 
government, proposes more prosecutions in the light of the work of the HRVIC. In the same 
vein, a well-designed policy framework on reparations which focus on the victims is argued 
for as it is imperative for a successful transition. 
1.6 Structure and Overview of the Chapters 
Chapter one considers the problem which this paper aims to address and the specific 
importance of this study. It reviews the available literature on the work of the HRVIC and 
presents the perspective which the study takes of transitional justice in Nigeria and the 
methodology employed in carrying out the study. 
Chapter two gives a brief historical and political overview of the violent past of Nigeria. It 
examines the successive military regimes until 1999, bringing to the fore the various forms of 
repression and gross human rights violations which characterised the military regimes in 
Nigeria.  
Chapter three examines briefly the concept of transitional justice and its mechanisms. It 
broadly examines the duty of Nigeria to prosecute human rights violations within its territory 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
and how compelling this duty is on Nigeria with respect to violations perpetrated by the past 
military regimes. This chapter then examines and evaluates prosecutions as a transitional 
justice mechanism in Nigeria. 
Chapter four focuses on adjuncts to prosecutions which serve as transitional justice measures. 
This chapter examines the issues of reparations of victims of human rights violations of the 
military regimes in Nigeria. It considers in particular the rehabilitation programme of Niger-
Delta militants as a form of reparative measure undertaken by the government. It also 
examines the case of Ken Saro Wiwa under the Alien Tort Claims Act before the US court in 
this context. 
Chapter five gives a brief summary of the entire research and makes relevant 
recommendations on areas that may be considered for a more effective transitional justice 
process in Nigeria. 
1.7 Research Methodology 
This study is based on desktop research on the concept of transitional justice and available 
literature on the subject of the research. The study makes use of both primary and secondary 
sources of materials for example the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
and other sources of law, accessible reported cases, books, articles, chapters in books, 
electronically published articles and newspaper reports on the prosecutions carried out during 
the transitory period. 
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Chapter Two - Historical Background to the Political Transition of 
Nigeria in 1999 
 ‘...historical understanding is not only a mirror on the past but also ...a guide to the future. 
[W]e must be prepared to confront this history, if we are to forge ahead. We need to 
understand it, even if it means asking unpleasant questions and offering blunt answers.’ 
 
        - Justice Chukwudifu A. Oputa
1
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the political background to the transition from military dictatorship to 
democracy in Nigeria. It gives an overview of the history of Nigeria since independence, 
especially focusing on the Abacha regime and also examining the transitory programme of 
Gen. Abdusalami Abubakar in 1999. The chapter seeks to establish a basic understanding of 
Nigeria’s history of repression and gross human rights violations which demanded the 
operation of transitional justice mechanisms in the Nigerian context. 
2.2 Military Regimes in Nigeria 
2.2.1 The Political Landscape of Nigeria Before 1983 
Nigeria, a former British colony, gained independence in 1960 and introduced a 
parliamentary system of government afterwards with the prime minister as the head of 
government and the president as the head of state.
2
 The country operated as a federation of 
three major regions.
3
 Each region was occupied by one of the three predominant ethnic 
groups in the country.
4
 The political landscape of the country was structured along its 
                                                 
1
 Chairman’s Report on Human Right Violations Investigation Commission 59. 
Available at http://nigerianmuse.com/nigeriawatch/oputa/OputaVolumeOne.pdf. (accessed August 2013)  
2
 Aborisade O and Mundt R Politics in Nigeria (1998) 128. 
3
 Aborisade O and Mundt R (1998) 117. The three regions in Nigeria were Eastern, Northern and Western 
regions. Before independence, each region was dominated by three different and powerful political parties. The 
National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) dominated the Eastern region while the Nigerian Peoples’ 
Congress (NPC) dominated the Northern region and the Action Group (AG) dominated the western region of 
the country. Historical Government in Nigeria. Available at http://motherlandnigeria.com/govt_history.html. 
(accessed August 2013). 
4
 The Yoruba ethnic group occupied the Western region, the Eastern region was occupied by the Igbos and the 
Northern region the Hausas.  
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regional division where different regional political parties dominated.
5
 The country had both 
federal and regional governments with the federal government operating at the highest level 
of the hierarchy and strong regional governments which were semi-autonomous.
6
 
At the regional level, each region had its own political structure and operated as a separate 
and distinct system of government from the central government, though not independent of it. 
Each region was headed by a premier and had separate legislative houses. The country 
operated under the 1960 Constitution which made provision for fundamental human rights of 
Nigerians which included civil and political rights
7
 and political representation at the federal 
level which operated on a regional basis. In the federal parliament, each region had its own 
representation based on its population.
8
 The Northern and the Eastern region each had 
representatives in the federal executive government. The prime minister was from the 
Northern region while the governor general was from the Eastern region. This representation 
was wrongly perceived by the Western region which did not only feel side-lined but also felt 
that the appointed prime minister would be controlled by the Northern region premier who 
was the leader of the NPC. This resulted in serious agitations from the western region led by 
Obafemi Awolowo, the regional premier.
9
 This marked the beginning of political breakdown 
in the Western region of the country which was heightened by the controversial trial and 
imprisonment of Obafemi Awolowo and subsequent appointment of a new premier Samuel 
Akintola who was perceive as a political ally of the Northern regional premier.
10
 The Western 
                                                 
5
 Each political party adopted the ideologies and identity of each region. At independence, the NCNC and the 
NPC formed an alliance from which the prime minister and the governor general of the federation emerged.  
6
 Falola T and Ihonvbere J ‘The Rise and Fall of Nigeria’s Second Republic’: 1979-84 (1985) 18.  
7
 Sections 24 and 37-38 of the 1960 Constitution of Nigeria. 
8
 The Northern region dominated the federal parliament and had more representation than the combination of 
the representation of the Western and Eastern region. The central government was thus dominated by the 
Northern region. Available at http://motherlandnigeria.com/govt_history.html. 
 
10
 The Northern regional premier was also a key leader of the ruling party at the federal level. 
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region subsequently split into two with the emergence of another political party, the Nigerian 
National Democratic Party.
11
 Agitations by other ethnic groups which resented the ethnic 
based political structure of the regional government pervaded the country and launched it 
deeper into political crises.
12
  
The 1963 population census result sparked off an even greater controversy at the regional 
level. The Northern region had an outrageously high population figure which was perceived 
by other regions as manipulated by the federal executive to favour its representation in the 
federal government.
13
 This had a serious impact on the 1964 election as people from the 
Eastern region as well as other parties boycotted the elections and the results were rejected by 
a vast majority of people from the region. In response, the president called for another 
election in the Eastern region only in 1965 to be supervised by the army while the prime 
minister had the option of forming a new government. The rescheduled election was violent 
while crises in the Western region persisted unabated as the newly emerged political party 
received limited support. Election in the Western region was marked by massive violence 
between parties and their supporters and this continued to threaten the Western regional 
government. The fact that the federal government could not suppress the various regional 
                                                 
11
 The Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) is a fraction of party members of the AG who broke away 
in support of Akintola.  The NNDP later formed alliance with the NPC to form the National Nigerian Alliance 
(NNA) in the 1964 elcetions. The agitation by the non- Yoruba ethnic group of the Western region led to the 
creation of the Mid-Western region and Dennis Osadebey was appointed as the premier of the region. Another 
party sprung up, the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) which was a coalition of the NCNC and the 
AG. The country’s politics swayed between these two opposing alliances. Available at 
http://motherlandnigeria.com/govt_history.html. 
12
 One of the prominent agitations which left an indelible effect on the country was the one led by the United 
Middle Belt Congress which composed of the Tiv ethnic group in the Northern region. A riot between the group 
and the supporters of NPC following the election result at independence resulted into violence which accounted 
for an estimated number of 30,000 people in the region. Available at 
http://motherlandnigeria.com/govt_history.html. 
13
 Aborisade O and Mundt R (1998) 14.  
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crises greatly diminished public confidence in the government and there was even a clamour 
for the intervention of the Nigerian army.
14
 
In January 1966, amid the prevalent political crises in the country, military army officers who 
were mainly from the Eastern region of the country overthrew the government in a bloody 
military coup. The prime minister was murdered along with the regional governors of the 
Northern and Western regions and some cabinet members of the federal executive, sparing 
the President who was at that time outside the country.
15
 This was the beginning of a series of 
military coups in the Nigerian political history which the country witnessed in the following 
decades. 
The 1966 military coup led to the introduction of a military regime to the Nigerian political 
system. Aguyi Ironsi became the first military ‘president’ of the country and promised to put 
an end to the violence in the country and return to civilian rule based on free and fair 
elections. He suspended the regional governments and dissolved all legislative bodies, 
banned political parties, and instituted a federal military government that occupied a central 
position in the country. Decisions were made by decrees which suspended the Constitution 
and ousted the jurisdiction of the Courts.
16
 The judiciary was deferent of these military 
decrees and upheld the new legal order in which repressive military decrees overrode the 
provisions of the Constitution. 
                                                 
14
 This call was made with the hope that peace will be restored just as it was in the earlier attempt during the 
Western region crises in 1962 -1963 when the federal government had declared a state of emergency in the 
region and the military was deployed to the region to quell the violence in the region. Available at 
http://motherlandnigeria.com/govt_history.html. 
15
 Aborisade O and Mundt R (1998) 15. 
16
 The Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 1 of 1966; State Security (Detention of Persons) 
Decree 3 of 1966 and Public Order and Security Decree 34 of 1966 were some of these decrees. These three 
decrees subsisted in varying forms throughout subsequent military interventions in Nigerian politics. 
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The regime later abolished federation as a system of government and adopted a unified 
system of government with a strong central political leadership. Aguyi’s regime was greatly 
criticised, first for favouring the Igbos from the Eastern region over indigenous groups from 
other regions and also for refusing to prosecute those who had killed political leaders in the 
North.
17
 This set the basis for another military intervention: Aguyi’s military regime in the 
end was short-lived and overthrown by another military coup in July 1966. Aguyi himself 
was assassinated along with other Igbo officials who had been part of his government. 
After the military coup of July 1966 Gowon, a military officer from the Northern region 
became head of the federal military government even though he had not been part of the 
coup. He restored federalism and regional based administration of government; each region 
now had a regional administrator. He also released the erstwhile premier of the Western 
region who had been imprisoned before the collapse of the civilian government in Nigeria, 
made promises to restore civilian rule in the country and made a move to divide the country 
into states out of the previously existing regions.
18
 
The Eastern regional governor however felt threatened by this move and thus resisted and 
declared the region as a separate and independent republic referred to as the Republic of 
Biafra. This declaration was seen as an attempt to secede from the country and was 
vehemently opposed by the central military government. This resulted in a civil war between 
the country and the proposed Biafra republic in June 1967 which lasted until the surrender of 
the region in January 1970. The war left the entire country greatly devastated with an 
                                                 
17
 Aborisade O and Mundt R (1998) 18. It was generally perceived in the Northern region that the coup was to 
strip the Northern region of its political influence and make the Igbos from the Eastern region dominant in the 
country’s politics. This resulted in a political rift between the dominant ethnic groups from the two regions. 
18
 Falola T and Ihonvbere (1985) 20; Daily Times 15 February 1966 4; Aborisade O & Mundt R (1998) 19. 
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estimated loss of over a million people.
19
 The ensuing years were spent in various attempts at 
re-integration and reconstruction in the Eastern region by Gowon. 
When the Gowon military administration failed in its promise to secure a civilian 
administration for the country
20
, in July 1975 his administration was overthrown in a non–
bloody military coup and Muritala Mohammed became the military leader of the country. His 
administration vigorously pursued the establishment of a democratic government. In 1975, 
the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) was established to draft a constitution for the 
country.
21
 His administration was notable for the various policies against corruption in the 
civil service, the judiciary and other sectors of the country. He was, however, assassinated in 
an abortive coup in February 1976, after which Obasanjo became the military administrator 
of the country. He followed up on the programmes of the Muritala administration, however, 
his government was characterised by restriction of political opposition, banning of union 
activities among other repressive acts. In 1978, a new Constitution had been adopted and 
replaced that of 1963.
22
 The country returned to a civilian regime after the elections in 1979 
in which Shehu Shagari was democratically elected as the president of the country for a term 
of four years based on the provisions of the 1979 Constitution.
23
 
The democratic system of government, however, was short-lived when the country was 
plunged again into military regime following the outcome of the elections in 1983.
24
 The 
                                                 
19
 Aborisade O and Mundt R (1998) 20-21. 
20
 Falola T and Ihonvbere J (1985) 21. The programme designed by Gowon to hand over power to a 
democratically elected government was not implemented till 1974, his administration then began to receive 
criticisms from the media and opposition to his regime. ‘Gowon became extremely repressive employing all 
available coercive weapons to deal with critics whom he treated as subversive agents’. 
21
 Aborisade and Mundt (1998) 22. 
22
 This constitution is referred to in this chapter as ‘the constitution’. 
23
 Falola T and Ihonvbere J (1985) 32. 
24
 Shehu Shagari had completed his four-year term as the president in 1983 and election were held subsequently 
as provided by the 1979 constitution. Shehu Shagari emerged as the winner of the elections in the result of the 
election s against his opponent Obafemi Awolowo. 
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administration itself had its own shortcomings.
25
 It was widely perceived that the election 
was marred with rigging. The result was contested in Court and Shehu Shagari was declared 
the winner of the election which stirred another series of widespread controversy in the 
country.
26
 The fall out of the decision was violence in several parts of the country and this set 
the stage for the military intervention in December 1983.
27
 
2.2.2 Military Regimes: 1983 – 1993 
The 1983 military coup upturned the second term of Shehu Shagari, and Muhammadu Buhari 
was appointed by the military as the new military administrator of the country. The 
intervention of the military at the time was largely accepted and seen as needed by many 
Nigerians. The new administration like others before it made a promise to return the country 
to a civilian regime. Buhari’s regime was, however, notorious not only for its policy on 
discipline in the public service and economic policies but also for its involvement in serious 
human rights violations. The restriction of press freedom, the banning of several 
organisations and the suppression of political opposition were hallmarks of the regime among 
several other human rights abuses. Buhari’s policies enjoyed more criticisms than support 
because of the economic hardship it created in the country thus paving way for the coup of 
1985 which overthrew his government. 
The 1985 coup was alleged to be in response to the human rights violations of Buhari’s 
administration but this was far from reality as greater human rights abuses were perpetrated 
                                                                                                                                                        
Available at http://motherlandnigeria.com/govt_history.html. (accessed August 2013) 
25
 Falola T and Ihonvbere J (1985) 159. State response to the nationwide strike of 1981 by the Nigerian Labour 
congress in demand was Repression and arrest of workers who had protested against the Essential Services 
Decree no 35 of the 1975 prescribed a death penalty or imprisonment of not less than 21 years for participating 
in industrial actions.  
26
 Falola T and Ihonvbere J (1985) 230. 
27
 It is popularly believed that there was an attempted coup by Buka Mandara of the Nigerian army in 1982 
which was however unsuccessful. More so, Shehu Shagari’s administration had been levelled with allegations of 
corruption, mismanagement of public funds and other flaw identified with his administration. Available at 
http://motherlandnigeria.com/govt_history.html. 
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by Babaginda’s military administration. Babaginda became the military head of state after the 
coup which ended the Buhari administration in which he was the chief of army staff. 
Babaginda perpetrated human righst violations which even outweighed that of the previous 
military regimes. Several obnoxious decrees were made to crush political opposition and 
press. These decrees permitted the perpetration of various oppressive acts and ousted the 
jurisdiction of any court to question the provisions of the decrees. Several attempted coups 
made by different military officers to overturn Babaginda’s administration were largely 
unsuccessful. Military officers and their collaborators responsible for the attempted coups 
were summarily executed by the Babaginda administration. 
In 1990, a Constitution was drafted in a bid to demonstrate the will to return to civilian 
regime, but this remained non-operative.  Public pressure mounted on the federal government 
forced it to conduct the elections of 1992 in order to hand over to a democratic government. 
The elections were conducted against widespread speculations that the government was 
unwilling to hand over power to a democratically elected government. These speculations 
turned out to be in fact true, no sooner had the election results announced that the federal 
government annulled the elections and proposed fresh elections.
28
 In 1993, another election 
was held and the results were announced with Moshood Abiola emerging as the winner of the 
elections. However, Babaginda made fresh allegations of fraud and annulled again the 
elections.
29
 
                                                 
28
 The federal government alleged fraud at the general elections of 1993 and thus proposed fresh election for 
another year. This was generally perceived as a delay tactics by the federal government and unwillingness of the 
Babaginda military administration to hand over government to a civilian. 
29
 Contrary to the purported allegation of the federal military government of Babaginda, the 1993 elections till 
date is generally perceived as the first free and fair elections held in Nigerian political history and the results 
were widely supported as a true reflection of the will of Nigerian populace. Thus, it became clear that the federal 
military government was not only unwilling to hand over government but was also ready to frustrate any attempt 
at transiting the country to democracy. Available at http://motherlandnigeria.com/govt_history.html. 
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This sparked off one of the largest social unrests in the country. There was nationwide 
demonstration and protest in several states of the country by human rights activist and 
supporters of democracy. The federal military government, however, responded by 
suppressing these demonstrations, killing hundreds of protesters and shutting down several 
opposition newspaper companies, but this did not quell public opposition and protest. On 
August 27 1993, Babaginda left office amidst heightened pressure and appointed Ernest 
Shonekan, a civilian, as the leader of the Interim National Government (ING).
30
 The ING 
only lasted three months, when Abacha, one of the cabinet ministers during Babaginda’s 
regime, executed a military coup in November 1993 which overthrew the interim government 
and returned the country to full military government. 
2.2.3 Abacha’s Military Regime: 1993 – 1998 
Abacha became the 7
th
 military head of state in Nigeria. His rule is particularly significant 
because of its notoriety, especially in the international community, for gross human rights 
violations. At first, he suspended the Constitution and all elected institutions including the 
national and the states houses of assembly, then, he banned all political activities and 
suppressed every form of independent press activity. He promised just like past military 
leaders in Nigeria to return the country to a democratic regime through free and fair elections 
within two years of his regime. This proposition was, however, far from the reality, as 
Abacha’s regime employed similar tactics to that of the Babaginda regime to frustrate such 
transition. Abacha’s regime violently suppressed any perceived political opposition.31 
                                                 
30
 The ING was instituted by Babaginda’s regime in place of proper hand over to a democratic elected 
government. The purpose of the interim government remained unclear while Babaginda described himself to 
have ‘stepped aside’ a phrase which has been widely interpreted to mean that he probably still had interest in 
regaining control of the country. 
31
 In 1994, Wole Soyinka a professor and human rights activist who was a strong opposition to the human rights 
abuses of the Abacha regime was to be arrested but he fled the country when he got a hint of the arrest. He was 
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In 1994, Abiola, the announced winner of the 1993 annulled election, was charged with 
treason after he had declared himself president over a particular region of the country and 
subsequently imprisoned by Abacha’s military regime. In 1995, Abacha announced a three 
year programme designed for transition to democratic rule as a follow up on his promise. An 
abortive coup against the Abacha regime in 1995 sent Obasanjo and Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, 
who were alleged coup plotters, to 25 years imprisonment. While Yar’Adua died in prison 
Obasanjo remained in prison during the rest of Abacha’s regime.32 Human rights abuses 
during Abacha’s regime were particularly marked by unlawful arrest, trial and imprisonment 
of human rights activist by a special military tribunal with capital sanctions such as life 
imprisonment and death penalty.
33
 Kudirat Abiola, who was the wife of Abiola, also became 
a victim of this policy. Subsequent to the imprisonment of her husband she started a 
campaign against the human rights violations of the military regime and military decrees 
banning political activities through public rallies and advocated for democracy. In June 1996, 
she was assassinated, and it was generally believed as political assassination sponsored by the 
Abacha military regime. Kudirat’s assassination was, however, only one out of many political 
assassinations carried out by the Abacha military.
34
 
The Ogoni people, who occupy the South –South geographical region of the country and had 
been subject to human rights violations since the exploration of oil began in the region in 
1958, had in particular been object of attacks by the regime. Babaginda’s regime had been 
                                                                                                                                                        
however subsequently charged for treason in absentia. He remained in exile during Abacha’s regime as treason 
was punishable with death.  
32
Also available at http://motherlandnigeria.com/govt_history.html. 
33
 Usually such trials are for offences such as treason and other offences perceived to be committed against the 
state. Beko Ransome Kuti, one of the prominent human rights activists was charged with treason and 
subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment but in 1995 it later reduced to 15 years imprisonment amidst 
protest by Amnesty International. Ogbondah C W Political Repression in Nigeria, 1993-1998: A Critical 
Examination of One Aspect of the Perils of Military Dictatorship (2000) 233.  
34
 Available at http://motherlandnigeria.com/govt_history.html. 
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notorious for using armed military personnel to brutally suppress, through torture and other 
inhumane treatment, agitations of the communities against oil spillage and other 
environmental damage caused by multinational companies that explored oil.
35
 However the 
high point of these human rights violations was during Abacha’s regime.  Agitations from the 
region had increased and led to the creation of the MOSOP
36
, an organisation which was 
formed to advocate for the rights of the people in the region. In 1995, one of the foremost 
leaders of MOSOP, Ken Saro Wiwa, and eight other leaders were arrested by the Abacha 
forces and were charged with conspiracy to kill political opponents. This allegation was 
widely believed to be untrue; the ‘Ogoni-Nine’ as it turned out subsequently, were rather 
arrested for their activities against the human rights violations in their region. The Ogoni-
Nine were sentenced to death after a summary trial. Despite the fact that the international 
community decried this decision, they were executed the same year. 
This action led to suspension of the country from the Commonwealth of Nations. In addition, 
there were several calls for international sanctions against Nigeria especially with regard to 
the oil from Nigeria which was the major source of the country’s foreign exchange.37 This 
had a terrible effect on the already depressed economy and the international image of the 
country. Abacha’s regime made attempt to redeem the image of the country through various 
regional peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In addition, Abacha scheduled 
fresh elections for transition to a democratic government and made himself candidate for 
                                                 
35
 In 1993, 300 000 Ogoni people had a peaceful protest against the human rights violations in their region 
especially the serious environmental damage caused by the activities  of the multinational oil companies 
operating in that region. S Cayford The Ogoni Uprising: Human Rights and a democratic Alternative in Nigeria 
Africa Today Vol. 43 No.2 (1996) 189. 
36
 MOSOP- Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People- was formed as a group of human rights activists 
which advocated for environmental remediation and monetary compensations for past damage. 
37
 United Nations General assembly Resolution A/RES/50/1995; In 1996 Amnesty International launched a 
worldwide campaign against human right violations. Nigeria Amnesty international statement- 11/08/96 
Available at http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_Action/apic_11896.html ( accessed September 2013) 
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presidential elections. Even though at first, these attempts restored hopes of many Nigerians 
that the country may return to a democratic regime, it did not achieve much. The human 
rights abuses persisted even on a higher scale.  In addition, these hopes were dashed when it 
became clearer that Abacha maintained sole candidacy for the presidency without any 
opposition.
38
 
In 1997, another coup was launched against Abacha’s regime but was unsuccessful and the 
alleged coup plotters were immediately imprisoned. Subsequently, the alleged coup leader 
along with four other military officers and a civilian were sentenced to death while others 
were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.
39
 
Meanwhile, Abacha established three different agencies under different military decrees in 
pursuit of his transition agenda. He established the Transition Implementation Committee 
(TIC), the Committee on Devolution of Powers (CDP), and the National Reconciliation 
Committee (NARECOM) in this light.
40
 
Finally, Elections to a democratic regime were scheduled for the August 1998 and 
commenced in October 1998 with Abacha maintaining sole candidacy for presidency. He, 
however, died while in office on June 8 1998 before the scheduled elections. 
2.2.4 Transitory Military Government of Gen. Abudulsalami Abubakar from 
9 June 1998– 29 May 1999 
Abudulsalami Abubakar became the head of state after the death of Abacha in June 1998 and 
set up a transition programme to a democratic government disregarding the one designed by 
                                                 
38
 This caused uprising in several parts of the country which resulted in violence and killings. 
39
 The alleged coup was widely believed to have been a set up by the regime to implicate the alleged leader of 
the coup, Oladipo Diya. Available at http://motherlandnigeria.com/govt_history.html. 
40
 Ogbondah C W Political Repression in Nigeria, 1993-1998: A Critical Examination of One Aspect of the 
Perils of Military Dictatorship (2000) 232. 
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Abacha. He initially intended to follow the scheduled date of return the country to democratic 
rule by October 1998 but when this became infeasible, May 1999 was fixed as the date of 
transition. 
At first, Abubakar released some of the political prisoners who had been incarcerated under 
previous military regimes, especially under Abacha’s, and also invited those who had gone 
on exile to return to the country to foster the transition programme.
41
 However, some of the 
prominent human rights activist and political opponents of the military regime were not 
immediately released even though there was a general demand from the population for their 
release especially of Abiola, the winner of the annulled election of June 1993, and his 
instalment as the president of the country since he won the last election.
42
 Abubakar, 
however, did not subscribe to the view of installing Abiola as the president of the country, 
instead he appealed that the past be forgotten and called for a new transition programme 
which should provide equality for all.
43
 Abiola, however, died while he was still in prison in 
July 1998. His death was attributed to his bad health condition after suspicion was raised as 
to the cause of his death and a call for inquiry by the public.
44
  
                                                 
41
 Abubakar Abudulsalami Association of Nigerian Scholars for Dialogue, My Transition Agenda for 
Development, A Text of Speech to the Nigerian Nation , available at 
http://www.waado.org/nigerian_scholars/archive/docum/genabdu.html (accessed August 2013). 
42
 Available at http://motherlandnigeria.com/govt_history.html. 
43
 In his speech on the transition programme   on 20 July 1998.  ‘Abubakar sought reconciliation. He stated that 
‘The June 12 presidential election and the controversial events preceding it were unfortunate in our political 
history. We cannot pretend that they did not happen. Yet we must accept that elections had similarly been 
cancelled in earlier situations. Equally more important, fully elected governments have been toppled. A call to 
return to the past is not helpful as it will be neither just nor fair, nor even practicable.’ Abubakar Abudulsalami’s  
Speech  
Available at http://www.waado.org/nigerian_scholars/archive/docum/genabdu.html (accessed August 2013). 
44
 Available at http://motherlandnigeria.com/govt_history.html. 
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On the recommendation of the Human Rights Commission (HRC), Abubakar also repealed 
repressive military decrees
45
 which were in violation of international human rights laws and 
which had made it possible for political opponents to be incarcerated without fair trial. The 
HRC had been established under Abacha’s regime to deal with all human rights issues in line 
with international human rights provisions to which Nigeria was signatory.
46
 The 
Commission, however, was heavily criticised for lack of accessibility.
47
 
2.3 The Transition to the Democratic Government of 1999 
Following the new transition programme elections were held in 1998/1999 and in May 1999 
an elected democratic government was installed in Nigeria. Obasanjo, a former military 
president, became the first civilian president after Nigeria’s long history of military regimes. 
The Human Rights Commission which had no constitutional status under the democratic 
government had set out plans to improve the human rights regime in Nigeria. The 
commission visited the South-South region of the country and submitted its report and 
proposals to the government on issues of human rights in the region and judicial reforms. 
The democratic dispensation expressed its dedication to respect the rule of law, investigate 
past human rights abuses following the South African example and make accountable 
perpetrators of human rights abuses. Since 1999, Nigeria has been under a democratic 
regime. 
                                                 
45
 Some of the military decrees are the State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No. 2 of 1984 and No. 11 of 
1994 which authorizes  arbitrary and indefinite detention of any citizen; treason and other Offences (Special In 
all about 31, decrees were repealed which includes Treason and Other Offences (Special Military Tribunal) 
decree No.1 of 1986 which established special military tribunal that conducted unfair trials and executed over 70 
armed officers and imprisoned several others as political prisoners Offensive  Publications (Proscription) Decree 
No. 35 of 1993 which allows the  state to seize any publication that offends the government, Treason and 
Treasonable Offenses Decree No. 29 of 1993 which provided power of military tribunals to impose life 
sentences on political opponents. 
46
 Sec. 5 of Decree No. 22 of 1995. 
47
 Reparations for Torture: A Survey of Law and Practice in 30 Selected Countries: Nigeria (2003) 5. Available 
at http://www.redress.org/africa/nigeria.  (accessed September 2013). 
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2.4 Conclusions  
When the military seized power in 1966, there was a general feeling in the country that it was 
motivated by altruistic intentions and objectives to save the country from descent into 
political chaos and instability.
48
 However, this turned out to be largely untrue as the 
foreboding could be perceived even from the very first military regime. Massive human 
rights violations and repressive government policies became the signature of the successive 
decades of military regime which chunked a large period of the country’s existence.49 
Overall, the political history of Nigeria reveals a long history of military intervention in 
government marred with gross human rights violations. These military regimes were marked 
by total breakdown of the criminal justice system, suspension of the constitution, 
promulgation of repressive decrees, absence of the rule of law and ousting the jurisdiction of 
the courts. Torture, systematic killing and incarceration of political opponents, abduction, 
suppression of the free press human rights organisations and unions, looting of public funds 
and money laundering were the hallmarks of these military regimes. 
These atrocities were state sponsored and perpetrated through government agencies mainly 
through the police and members of the armed forces. During the Babaginda and Abacha 
regimes (1985-1998) the military personnel operating under the State Security Services and 
the directorate of Military Intelligence were used to carry out these atrocities. 
                                                 
48
 HVRIC Report. Available at http://nigerianmuse.com/nigeriawatch/oputa/ (accessed August 2013). 
49
 The high water mark of the struggle against military rule in Nigeria was the ‘return to democratic civilian rule 
on 29 May 1999, symbolizes and marks the return to the project of the three Rs (Rehabilitation, Reconstruction 
and Reconciliation), which the military enunciated after the end of the civil war in January 1970.’ – Justice 
Chukwudifu A. Oputa  HVRIC Report. Available at http://nigerianmuse.com/nigeriawatch/oputa/. 
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Given the long history of military regime in Nigeria, the question arises how Nigeria has 
handled this past legacy of gross human rights abuses after the transition. This question will 
be analysed in the following chapters. 
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Chapter Three - The Concept of Transitional Justice in the Nigerian 
Context: Investigation and Prosecution of Gross Human Rights 
Violations 
‘The adequate investigation of human rights violations is essential if the full truth is to 
emerge. Victims ... and society at large all have an interest in knowing the truth about past 
abuses and in the clarification of unresolved human rights crimes. Similarly, bringing the 
perpetrators to justice would send a clear message that such violations will not be tolerated in 
the future and that those who commit such acts will be held fully accountable.’  
            
    – Amnesty International1 
3.1 Introduction 
Transitional justice deals with how a society reckons with the past human rights abuses 
committed by predecessor regimes or during a conflict.
2
 This chapter examines briefly the 
concept of transitional justice and its mechanisms. It considers the work of the Human Rights 
Violations Investigation Commission (HRVIC) as a significant transitional justice measure in 
Nigeria. While this paper does not constitute an in-depth study of the work of the HRVIC, its 
work is pivotal to the consideration of transitional justice in Nigeria. In addition, this chapter 
examines prosecutions as a mechanism for redress of the human rights abuses of the past 
military regimes in Nigeria. 
3.2 Definitional and Structural Conception of Transitional Justice 
The concept of transitional justice entails how a society confronts human rights abuses of the 
past, thus paving the way for a society ordered on an established system of rule of law and 
respect for human rights.
3
 Transitional justice is a conception of justice that is associated, as 
                                                 
1
 Nigeria: Time for Justice and Accountability (2000) 16. Available at 
www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR44/014/2000 (accessed September 2013). 
2
 Roht Arriaza N ‘The new landscape of Transitional Justice’ in Roht-Arriaza N and Mariezurrena J (eds.) 
Transitional Justice in the twenty-first Century: Beyond Truth Versus Justice,(2006) 2; also defined as 
associated with periods of political change [and aimed at confronting] the wrong doings of repressive 
predecessor regimes.’ Teitel R Transitional Justice (2000) 69. 
3
 ‘Without a proper engagement with the past and the institutionalisation of remembrance, societies are 
condemned to repeat, re-enact and relive the horror. Forgetting is not good strategy for societies transiting from 
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the name indicates, with a period of transition. Such transition could be after a period of 
repressive regime, conflict or civil strife.
4
 In this sense it has been said that 
‘[t]ransitional justice is not a “special” kind of justice, but an approach to achieving 
justice in times of transition from conflict and/or state repression. By trying to 
achieve accountability and redressing victims, transitional justice provides 
recognition of the rights of victims promotes civic trust and strengthens the 
democratic rule of law.’5 
Transitional justice may, therefore, be achieved in two forms: retributive and restorative 
justice. While retributive justice focuses on the perpetrators and on bringing them to account 
for their past misdeeds, restorative justice focuses on the victims and redressing the damage 
suffered from the past abuses through restoration or compensation. Certain mechanisms have 
been recognised as means of achieving transitional justice and these include prosecutions, 
truth commissions, amnesty, reparations and lustrations.
6
  
The mechanisms of transitional justice mainly engage violations of civil and political rights 
and may not necessarily involve violations of economic and social rights. Thus, it excludes 
criminal acts such as misappropriation of public funds, fraud, embezzlement, money 
laundering and corruption among other economic crimes. In this context, this paper does not 
constitute an examination of the economic crimes committed by the previous military 
regimes. Even though it is important to state that it constitutes one of the major concerns of 
the successive government because of its impact on the human rights during the military 
regimes. 
                                                                                                                                                        
a minimally decent condition’ – Bhargava R ‘Restoring Decency to Barbaric Societies’ in Rotberg R & 
Thompson D ed. Truth Versus Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions 54. 
4
 As in note 2 above Roht-Arriaza N. 
5
 ICTJ- What is Transitional Justice? Available at http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice (accessed September 
2013); N Roht-Arriaza (2006) 12-13. 
6
 ICTJ-The Element of a Comprehensive Transitional Justice Mechanism. Available at 
http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice (accessed September 2013). 
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3.3 The Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (‘Oputa Panel’) 
In the Nigerian context, first steps towards the employment of transitional justice 
mechanisms had already been initiated by the Abubakar regime when he repealed many of 
the repressive military decrees. Later, President Obasanjo
7
 in his inaugural speech expressed 
his commitment to combat impunity for perpetrators of human rights violations and to reform 
and strengthen the criminal justice system. For this purpose, the Human Rights Violations 
Investigation Commission was established by the federal government as a model of truth 
commission to investigate and redress past human rights abuses.
8
 Its main mandate was 
‘to establish the causes, nature, and extent of human rights violations between 15 
January 1966 and 28 May 1999, to identify perpetrators, determine the role of the 
state in the violations and to recommend means to pursue justice and prevent future 
abuses.’9 
With this mandate the Commission viewed forgiveness and reconciliation as part of its goal 
drawing on the president’s speech at the inauguration of the commission which emphasised 
reconciliation.
10
 
The chairman of the HRVIC was Justice Chukwudifu Oputa and seven other members were 
appointed by the president.
11
 The Commission had a one year-mandate which was extended 
and eventually took twenty-eight months. It received about 11,000 petitions from victims and 
survivors of human rights abuses across the country out of which 150 cases considered to be 
very serious were selected for hearing. Hearings were conducted in public sessions held in 
                                                 
7
 All references made to the president in this section refer to Obasanjo, the democratic president of Nigeria 
(1999-2007). 
8
 The Commission also referred to as HRVIC/Oputa Panel in this essay was established under Statutory 
Instrument No. 8 of 1999. The terms or reference of the panel was later amended by the Statutory Instrument 
No. 13 of 1999. 
9
 HRVIC Report Vol. 1 29. 
10
 HVRIC Report: Synoptic Overview 9. Available at 
 http://www.justiceinperspective.org.za/images/nigeria/Nigeria%20Oputa%20Recommendations.pdf (accessed 
September 2013). President Inaugural Address 14 June 1999 at the State House Abuja 1-2.   
11
 The Chairman was a retired Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria and other members as distinguished 
individuals both in the Nigerian judiciary and other disciplines. 
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five different cities
12
 to ensure ease of access across the country. The Commission had 
subpoena powers and petitioners could have legal representation. The Commission received 
evidence of human rights violations such as torture and extrajudicial executions. 
The HRVIC experienced both challenges and successes. The Commission had limited 
resources to carry out independent investigations and received limited international support.
13
 
Past military heads of states and members of the military ruling class summoned by the 
Commission failed to appear before it. The establishment of the Commission was even 
challenged as unconstitutional by some of the past military leaders, who had refused to 
appear before it.
14
 It is, however, notable that the Nigerian president Obasanjo, who was once 
a military head of state, appeared before the Commission to give evidence.  
In the midst of the challenges, the Commission concluded its work and submitted its report to 
the president in May 2002 which was, however, never officially released. Initially the 
president inaugurated an implementation committee upon the receipt of the report in June 
2002 to begin the process of implementation but this was later dismissed on the ground that 
the legality of the Commission had been challenged in the courts.
15
 The Supreme Court 
(SC)
16
 had held that the Commission was not established by the appropriate authority.
17
 
There have been contentions as to the true effect of the
 
decision of the SC
18
 but it is apposite 
to state that the decision of the federal government not to release or implement the report 
                                                 
12
 Abuja, Lagos, Enugu, Port-Harcourt and Kano. 
13
 Yusuf H O ‘Travails of justice:Achieving Justice for the Victims of Impunity in Nigeria’ (2007) 282. 
14
  Brigadier Kunle Togun (Rtd.) V. Justice Chukwudifu Oputa (Rtd.) and 3 ORS (2001) 16 NWLR pt (740) 
577. 
15
  The Guardian Newspaper 18 September 2001 Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200109180027.html 
(Accessed October 2013). The Implementation Committee had eight members headed by Elizabeth Pam. It 
concluded its work and submitted its report to the government three months after its establishment which was 
before the decision of the Supreme Court. 
16
 The SC is the apex court in the country with the final decision in any matter. 
17
 Fawehinmi V. Babaginda (2003) NWLR pt (808) 604. The SC relied on the provisions of Tribunals of Inquiry 
Act CAP 447 and 1999 Constitution. 
18
 Yusuf H O (2007) 284. 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
based on this decision is quite pretentious. The report had been submitted since 2002 and the 
decision of the SC was in 2003 and the decision did not restrain the government from 
implementing the recommendations.
19
 
The report was, however, unofficially published by a civil society.
20
 Therefore, its content is 
widely known today, despite the decision of the Court against the legality of the Commission. 
Despite its challenges, the HRVIC contributed to reconciliation of warring communities, 
among others of the Maroko in Lagos State and the Ife and Modakeke in Osun state.
21
 The 
Commission established that the military was responsible for gross human rights violations as 
well as some state counsels in the Ministry of Justice in order to protect perpetrators in 
certain named cases.
22
 It identified direct perpetrators in certain cases and recommended 
further investigations and subsequent prosecution of alleged perpetrators.
23
 It also 
recommended reparations for victims of human right violations in the country and reform of 
armed forces, the military intelligence and the police.
24
 Over 35 cases were forwarded to the 
Inspector General of Police for further investigations and subsequent prosecution where 
necessary.
25
 This figure is an indicator of the potential number of cases which ought to go to 
trial based on the work of the Commission. The question that remains pertinent, however, is: 
does Nigeria have the duty to prosecute these cases? If Nigeria has a duty to prosecute, how 
well has Nigeria fulfilled this duty? 
                                                 
19
 Falana F ‘The Oputa Panel report’ Guardian Newspaper 8 January 2005. Available at 
http://www.dawodu.com/falana2.htm (accessed September 2013).   
20
 Nigeria Muse available at http://nigerianmuse.com/nigeriawatch/oputa/ (accessed October 2013). 
21
 HVRIC Report: Synoptic Overview 9. 
22
 HVRIC Report: Vol. 7 Summary Conclusion and Recommendations 32. 
23
 HVRIC Report: Vol. 7 34-35; 53; 68. 
24
 HVRIC Report: Vol. 6 Reparations Restitution and Compensation 47. 
25
 HVRIC Report: (note 23). 
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3.4 Prosecutions as a Transitional Justice Measure 
Prosecution as a transitional justice mechanism seeks to bring perpetrators of past abuses to 
account for their misdeeds. This is usually pursued through the criminal justice system and 
could be at the national or international levels. Prosecution in this sense encompasses 
criminal investigation, trial and sentencing of alleged perpetrators of such abuses. In this 
regard, questions such as whom to prosecute and the legal basis for prosecutions become 
paramount. 
3.4.1 The Duty to Prosecute 
Constitutional Obligation to Prosecute 
The adoption of the new Constitution on 29 May 1999 by the newly elected democratic 
government served as the legal basis for measures to confront the past.
26
 Chapter Four of the 
Constitution provides and guarantees fundamental human rights ranging from right to life to 
right to freedom of expression and provides for redress for any violation of such right which 
is largely in form of prosecution. The remedies available could be monetary compensation or 
any order the court deems fit considering the extent of injury suffered by the victim. Other 
remedies could be common law damages for tortuous acts such as assault and battery.
27
 This 
significantly reflects a different disposition to human rights as opposed to what obtained 
during the military regimes. The obligation to prosecute is inferred from the duty to guarantee 
and protect the rights provided in the Constitution.
28
  
                                                 
26
 This is without prejudice to criticisms as to the legality of the 1999 Constitution. It is argued that the 
Constitution was a hasty decision of the Provisional Military Council of Abubakar’s transitory government just 
three months to transition. -  Diala A ‘The Dawn of Constitutionalism in Nigeria’ in Mbondenyi M and Ojienda 
T (eds.) Constitutionalism and Democratic Governance in Africa: Contemporary Perspectives from Sub-
Saharan Africa (2013) 157; 161 
27
 Sec. 46 of the 1999 Constitution. 
28
 Often this provision of the Constitution is interpreted in favour of civil litigation in order for victims of human 
rights to obtain remedies than with respect to criminal prosecution of perpetrators of human rights violations. 
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Obligation to Prosecute under International Law  
The duty to prosecute certain human rights violations is generally provided for by various 
international treaties.
29
 These treaties are limited to cases of genocide, torture and war crimes. 
However, the duty to prosecute human rights violations can be inferred from Article 2(1) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which provides for the duty 
of a state to give remedy to victims of human rights violations from which duty to prosecute 
violations of human rights can be inferred from this duty. Generally, under the African 
Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights the duty to prosecute can be inferred from the 
provisions of Article 7. Specifically Article 26 of the Charter provide for the duty to 
guarantee the independence of Courts to ensure promotion and protection of human rights by 
state parties.  
Flowing from the above provisions, Nigeria has a duty to prosecute human rights violations 
within its territory in fulfilment of its obligations under the treaties to which Nigeria is a 
party. These are the four Geneva Conventions, the ICCPR, the Torture Convention (which 
Nigeria ratified in 2001), the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981(to which 
Nigeria has been a state party since 1982). 
                                                                                                                                                        
However, this provision can also be interpreted to imply criminal prosecution especially in the light of 
international obligations to prosecute. 
29
The duty to prosecute by state is broadly provided for in articles IV-VI of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948 for genocide; Articles 50 51 130 and 147 of the 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field (Geneva Convention I); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at the Sea (Geneva Convention II); Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention III); Geneva Convention Relative to the protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV) of 12 august 1949 and Article 7 of the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984. Article 
2(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom of 4 November 
1950 also provide for the duty to protect the right to life while Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966 provide for the duty of a state to give remedy to victims of 
human rights violations from which the duty to prosecute violations of human rights is derived. The duty to 
prosecute is also inferred from the article 26 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of June 
1981.  
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3.4.2 Prosecutions as a Transitional Justice Mechanism in Nigeria 
The duty to prosecute human rights violations as torture, inhumane treatment and 
extrajudicial killings which constitute the hallmarks of past military regimes is, therefore, 
foreseen by both national and international provisions. The essence of prosecution is to make 
the perpetrators individually accountable for their atrocities as well as achieve justice for the 
victims of their actions. However, in Nigeria very little has been done with respect to 
prosecution of the perpetrators for human right abuses in the past military regimes neither has 
amnesty been formally granted to the perpetrators. The few trials which were initiated 
immediately after transition are discussed subsequently. 
While the HRVIC conducted its investigations, three major trials were initiated against some 
of the alleged perpetrators of human rights violations in October 1999. The Special 
Investigative Panel (SIP) was established in 1999, under the office of the National Security 
Adviser. It undertook special investigations on some of the cases which eventually went to 
trial.
30
 In all the three cases, prosecution was initiated at the State High Court (HC). 
Trial of Al-Mustapha, Mohammed Abacha and others 
In October 1999, Major Al-Mustapha, former Chief Security Officer during the Abacha 
regime, and Mohammed Abacha, son of the late military head of state, were charged with the 
conspiracy and attempted murder of Alex Ibru, a newspaper publisher and former Minister of 
Internal Affairs in the Abacha regime. Other defendants charged in this case were General 
Ishaya Bamaiyi, former Chief of Army Staff, Mohammed Rabo Lawal, former Chief 
                                                 
30
 Available at 
http://www.refworld.org/topic,50ffbce484,50ffbce487,3ae6ad056c,0,,QUERYRESPONSE,NGA.html Also at 
http://saharareporters.com/press-release/lagos-rejoinder-advertorial-dr-fredrick-fasheun-al-
mustapha%E2%80%99s-case-setting-record-stra (accessed October 2013). 
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Superintendent of Police (CSP), Col. Jubrin Bala Yakubu, former military administrator of 
Zamfara state, and, Danbaba James, former Commissioner of Police of Lagos state. 
Al-Mustapha was also the head of a killer squad referred to as the ‘Strike Force’, a group 
responsible for many of the human rights abuses of the Abacha regime. The prosecution 
witness, a former army sergeant, who had been part of the ‘Strike Force’, testified that he and 
a senior police officer had fired at Alex Ibru, acting on the orders of superior officers. 
However, this case was dismissed and all the defendants (except Bamaiyi) discharged and 
acquitted in 2010.
31
 The Court upheld the ‘no case submission’ argued by the defence and 
held that the prosecution failed to establish a prima-facie case against the defendants despite 
the testimony of the sergeant. The Court further held that the defendants could not be 
convicted on the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
32
 The acquittal of Al-Mustapha in this 
case did not affect the charges against him in other cases in which he was equally charged 
with other offences.
33
 
While the trial subsisted, the charge against Gen. Bamaiyi was separated and fresh charges 
were brought against him in a separate case in November 2007. In the separate case which 
was instituted against Bamaiyi there were the same charges of conspiracy and attempted 
murder of Alex Ibru Porbeni and Pat Utomi and also additional charges of ‘unlawfully 
causing grievous harm’.34 This move by the Prosecution was perceived by the defendants as a 
‘kangaroo arrangement’.35 Bamaiyi was however discharged and acquitted in April 2008 in a 
                                                 
31
 AllAfrica 22 December 2010 – Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201012220252.html (accessed 
October 2013). 
32
 The judge held that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was thoroughly discredited under cross-
examination. “I therefore hold that there is no credible evidence in support of the six-count charge preferred 
against the accused persons”. 
33
 ThisDay Newspaper of 30 January 2012. 
34
 ThisDay Newspaper of 21 November 2007. 
35
 As in 30 note above. 
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judgment by the Court that the prosecution failed to discharge the burden of proof in the 
case.
36
 
These trials reflect clearly the disposition of the judiciary and the government in handling the 
cases initiated after transition. First, these cases had suffered a lot of set-backs and delay. The 
trials had begun first at the Magistrate Court before it was transferred to the HC and even at 
the HC level, it was transferred from one Court to another. The transfer did not only delay the 
trials but also distorted the cause of justice. It could be inferred that the judiciary was 
unwilling to adjudicate the cases and lacked the independence to address these cases. Several 
controversies trailed these cases especially in the instance of allegation of bribery against the 
presiding judge at the first HC.
37
 
The trial of Al-Mustatpha and Lateef Shofolahan  
In another case, Mohammed Abacha, one of General Abacha’s sons, was charged with Al-
Mustapha, Lateef Shofolahan, a protocol officer in Abiola’s campaign organisation and two 
others for conspiracy and murder of Kudirat Abiola. However, the charges could only be 
sustained against Al-Mustapha and Shofolahan while charges against the other perpetrators 
were dismissed.
38
  
Shofolahn had already been charged with attempted murder of Pa Abraham Adesanya in 
1996
39
 and was convicted and sentenced to 28 years for complicity in the attempted murder 
                                                 
36
 Daily Champion Newspaper 4 April 2008. 
37
  Nigerian Premium Times Newspaper 4 August 2013. 
38
 Daily Trust Newspaper 17 July 2013. Available at http://dailytrust.info/index.php/columns/wednesday-
columns/944-al-mustapha-now-that-the-canary-is-free (accessed October 2013). 
39
 ThisDay Newspaper 31 Jan. 2012. Available at http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/for-al-mustapha-it-s-
death-by-hanging/108225/ (accessed September 2013). 
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in 2009.
40
 This trial was a separate trial on its own and the conviction of the Shofolahan 
operated differently from other charges against him. 
Al-Mustapha and Sofolahan had been in detention during the trial which took thirteen years 
before the first verdict was handed down by the HC. The defendants were convicted and 
sentenced to death by the Court in January 2012.
41
 The defendants appealed against the 
decision of the HC at the Court of Appeal (CA) immediately.
42
 In July 2013, the CA upturned 
the decision of the HC and discharged the defendants.
43
 The State has appealed against the 
decision at the Supreme Court but it is uncertain what the course the case will take.
44
  
3.4.3. Evaluation of the Nigerian Prosecutions 
Despite the fact that in the last trial mentioned the accused persons were acquitted at appeal’s 
level just like in the other trials, it is important to consider the significance and challenges of 
this trial even though the last verdict has. First, it is notable that the above trial is the only 
trial sustained to the point of conviction out of the five trials initiated in 1999. The trial has 
been one of the longest trials in Nigerian history; the trial at the HC alone took thirteen years. 
The trial was at most times, unduly prolonged at the instance of the defence.
45
 This had great 
impact on the success of the trials. Evidence became distorted and the interest of the public 
could not be sustained after several adjournments of the cases without significant progress. 
                                                 
40
 The Nation Newspaper 24 Aug. 2011 Available at 
http://www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/index.php/mobile/columnist/wednesday/dele-agekameh/16986-
shofolahan-and-kudirat%E2%80%99s-murder.html (accessed October 2013). 
41
 As in note 39 above. 
42
 Punch Newspaper 31 January 2012 -Available at http://www.punchng.com/news/al-mustapha-shofolahan-
appeal-death-sentence/ (accessed October 2013). 
43
 Vanguard Newspaper 17 July 2013-Available at http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/07/why-appeal-court-
freed-al-mustapha-co/ (accessed October 2013). 
44
 The Sun Newspaper 14 August 2013. Available at http://sunnewsonline.com/new/cover/kudirat-abiolas-
murder-lagos-drags-al-mustapha-shofalahan-to-scourt/ (accessed October 2013). 
45
 Akinnola R ‘Travesty of Justice ’ as quoted in Chronicle of Al-Mustapha’s 14 year-Trial – Vanguard 
Newspaper 08 August 2013 Available at http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/08/chronicle-of-al-mustaphas-14-
year-trial/ (accessed October 2013). 
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One major challenge of prosecution stemming from the length of the trial is the effect it had 
on procedural issues such as eliciting evidence from witnesses and issues as to selectivity. 
The CA in upturning the decision of the HC concluded that there was no conclusive evidence 
linking the accused to the alleged offence and, therefore, the accused had to be acquitted. The 
prosecution had to prove its case with credible evidence with the bar of the standard of prove 
raised as “beyond reasonable doubts”.46 The two key prosecution witnesses Barnabas Jabilla 
(also called Rogers) and Abdul Muhammed (katako) had made statements on oath regarding 
the charge but later contradicted their statements.
47
 It remains to be known whether the duo 
will be tried for perjury. Al-Mustapha himself was reported to have made a confessional 
statement to the SIP at the beginning of the case which he also retracted. 
The prosecution was perceived as a tool to ‘pay back’ enemies. The president had also been a 
victim of political imprisonment and perhaps torture during the Abacha regime. He was 
reported as ‘avenging his ordeal during Abacha’s military regime’ through the prosecution.48 
Perpetrators, who were charged, alleged selectivity in the choice of prosecution. Al-Mustapha 
was reported to have stated that he was being made a victim of the incumbent power in the 
country.
49
 While these claims may be true to a certain degree, it does not render the need for 
prosecution invalid, Al-Mustapha had been a prominent figure for repression during the 
Abacha regime. The prosecution became necessary first because Nigeria has a constitutional 
duty to protect human rights and to redress the violation of such rights. Indeed, other 
                                                 
46
 This Day Newspaper 21 July 2013. 
47
 These two witnesses were also charged along with the other defendants. They were alleged to be the 
responsible ‘foot soldiers’ that carried out the actual shooting at the behest of al-Mustapha. – Available at 
http://saharareporters.com/press-release/lagos-rejoinder-advertorial-dr-fredrick-fasheun-al-
mustapha%E2%80%99s-case-setting-record-stra (accessed October 2013).  
48
 Pointblank News.com 14 November 2009 Available at http://www.pointblanknews.com/os2427.html 
(accessed October 2013). 
49
 Vanguard Newspaper 21 July 2013-Available at http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/07/why-appeal-court-
freed-al-mustapha-co-3/ (accessed October 2013). 
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potential cases were either dismissed or never initiated in total defiance of the 
recommendations of the HRVIC regarding prosecutions. 
The thirty fives cases recommended for further investigations by the Panel have been simply 
ignored by successive regimes. In cases where the court could not establish any case against 
the alleged perpetrators, Nigeria has failed to pursue further investigations in the least. These 
cases have rather been successfully tucked away. There has been no criminal investigation of 
widely alleged human rights abuses of the military regimes, prominent among which are the 
mass massacre during the civil war, the political assassination of Dele Giwa and the extra-
judicial killing of and Ken Saro Wiwa and the Ogoni-nine.
50
 
Furthermore, certain alleged and identified perpetrators have neither been investigated nor 
prosecuted till date. Babaginda had been alleged for several human rights abuses during his 
regime including the murder of Dele Giwa which raised a lot of controversy during the 
HRVIC hearing. He has, however, never been brought to answer such charges in spite of the 
overwhelming allegations. 
In addition, the fact that only the charge of murder was sustained against Al-Mustapha, 
suggests selectivity. Unlike the position in other countries, like Argentina
51
 where fairly 
considerable prosecution has taken place on the basis of the work of a truth commission, in 
Nigeria prosecutions had commenced simultaneously with the work of the HRVIC. More 
significantly, trials conducted so far have focused on single cases of murder and attempted 
murder and have left out gross human rights abuses such as those perpetrated in Ogoniland, 
                                                 
50
 See Ch. 2. 
51
 Acuna C and Smulovitz ‘Guarding the Guardians in Argentina: Some Lessons about the Risks and benefits of 
Empowering the Courts’ in McAdams A (ed.) Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in New Democracies 
(1997) 105-106. 
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several political murders and torture. None of the cases is connected to the systematic human 
rights violations of extra-judicial killings, prosecutions has been limited to single cases of 
human rights abuses. While these cases are no less important than the others it is represent 
gross ‘under-prosecution’. 
Successive governments have repeatedly ignored the cases of human rights abuse in the 
Niger-Delta region.
52
 It has paid no attention to the violations and this has encouraged the 
persistence of human rights violations in the region even after transition to a democratic 
dispensation. Indeed, during the military regimes, there were military decrees which ousted 
the jurisdiction of the Nigerian Courts so that no case could be brought before any Nigerian 
Court with regards to human rights violations in the region. Since these decrees have been 
annulled this provision is no longer operative under the democratic government, the Court 
have jurisdiction to adjudicate on matters which it is constitutionally empowered to. 
However, no single case of violations in this region is known to have been brought before the 
Courts for criminal prosecution neither has the State taken any steps to prosecute any of the 
well-known cases. 
There is manifest unwillingness to pursue prosecution even the well founded. The problem of 
retroactivity does not appear since the applicable laws had been in existence even during the 
military regime
53
 and so it could not have been hampered by the dilemma of the applicable 
law as the case is with most transitional states after a repressive regime. The provisions of the 
Criminal Code has been the applicable law in all the cases discussed above since most of the 
human rights violations constitute criminal acts under the Criminal Code. It is not debateable 
in the Nigerian case that there is no legal basis for prosecution of the gross human rights 
                                                 
52
 The Niger-Delta region is also referred to as the South-South region of Nigeria. See Ch. 2. 
53
 Criminal Law Code of Lagos State was applicable. ThisDay Newspaper of 21 November 2007. 
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violations of the military regimes. Such argument is unsustainable in the light of the 
overwhelming legal obligations of the Nigerian government which clearly prohibits any legal 
justification for such violations during the military regime. 
In addition, criminal actions can be instituted against an accused person at any time. There is 
no bar with regard to the period of time within which criminal action can be instituted against 
a person alleged of any criminal offence. This makes it clearly possible for more prosecutions 
to be pursued where there is the political will to do so. Even though the prosecution 
authorities have expressed intention to further pursue the case of Al-Mustapha to the 
Supreme Court, which has the final verdict in any case, it appears unlikely that the state is 
interested in pursuing further prosecutions. Where there is fresh evidence to substantiate 
these allegations otherwise a proper investigation could be initiated into these cases and many 
others which have been ignored in the past years.  
3.5 Conclusions 
The Oputa Panel would have been largely successful in achieving truth telling by revealing 
shocking atrocities of the past military regimes had the report been officially published. Even 
though from the hearings conducted and the unpublished report it is glaring that the ‘truth 
was needed to reverse the silence and denial of dictatorship years, to establish the extent 
origin and nature of the crimes which were not well-known’.54 Even where the truth was 
common knowledge there had been a huge gap between knowledge and acknowledgment and 
to a large extent. As important as the work of the Commission would have been, it lacked the 
legitimacy it needed to operate successfully.  
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 Roht-Arriaza N (2006) 3. 
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The Government hid under this guise to assert that it could not implement the 
recommendations of the HRVIC. It remains to be known what has happened to other cases 
which were not admitted by the HRVIC.  
The weaknesses of the HRVIC may have set the course of the trials which were initiated. It is 
highly probable that the success of the trials depended on the success of the Commission. The 
moment the report of the Commission was submitted the five cases which had been initiated 
took a different direction thus Nigeria’s progress with redressing the past was short-lived.  
It became clearer that the successive government may not have had a real intent at 
confronting the past but only initiated steps as a facade in order to gain public support. It 
could also be that it had real intentions to redress the past but derailed because it found that it 
would itself have issues to answer and was not prepared to face the consequences of its past 
actions. Even though a democratically elected government, it had within its system 
perpetrators whose interest it had to protect. The president himself had appeared before the 
Commission to answer for allegation of human rights violations during his military regime
55
 
More significant is the recent acquittal of the defendants in the only surviving case of the five 
cases. Without prejudice to the pending appeal at the SC, the acquittal implies that there is 
need for proper investigation to identify the perpetrators otherwise, it will amount to a 
‘denial’ of the murder and several other human rights abuses. The prosecutions conducted so 
far do not only demonstrate a hollow attempt at redressing the past, but also portray further 
lack of political will to confront the past. The victims of the past injustices are left without 
any remedy. 
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 AllAfrica -11 Sept. 2001 Available at http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/07/why-appeal-court-freed-al-
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It is also important to state that courts and the legal system generally play an important role in 
transitional justice. The Oputa Panel demonstrates the ‘tension between truth seeking 
mechanism, constitutionalism and judicial process’.56 The judiciary just emerging from a 
criminal justice system that disregarded human rights may need to be placed in proper 
perspective as to its role in achieving justice, this is particularly true for Nigeria. Where the 
court is still under the whims and caprices of the executive power, it cannot independently 
ensure justice and redress of human rights violation without a form of ‘re-engineering’.  
The refusal to investigate or prosecute other alleged perpetrators cannot be regarded as ‘de 
facto amnesties. Indeed, part of the aim of the successive democratic government was to 
ensure reconciliation and this was expressed as part of the aims of the HRVIC, it clearly 
stated in its report that this would be attained through both retributive and restorative 
measures which ultimately implies that prosecution is an integral part of the reconciliation 
process.
57
 Reconciliation is inoperative where there is no proper acknowledgement of wrongs 
done against the victims of human rights violations and in this sense, reconciliation as an aim 
of the HRVIC was also a failed venture.  
There is always a dividing line between reconciliation and impunity, and the aims of justice 
cannot be eroded by the objective of reconciliation. Reconciliation does not rest in indulgent 
ignorance of past injustices or the plight of the victims. Reconciliation does not proscribe 
prosecution and the failure to prosecute amounts to creating an avenue to breed a culture of 
impunity. It is highly probable that the failure to prosecute accounts for the increased 
violence in Nigeria even after almost two decades of transition to a democratic regime. 
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Chapter Four - Alternatives and Adjuncts to Prosecutions 
‘Redress should be tailored to the particular needs of the victim and be proportionate to the 
gravity of violations committed against them... [T]he provision of reparation has an inherent 
preventive and deterrent effect in relation to future violations.’ 
        -UN Committee against Torture
1
  
4.1 Introduction 
Nigeria may not only be under an obligation to prosecute the perpetrators of past human 
rights violations but also to provide effective remedy for the victims of these crimes. 
‘Effective remedy’ may not necessarily be limited to retributive measures, restorative 
measures may also constitute effective remedy. This chapter focuses on reparations and 
lustrations as transitional justice mechanisms in Nigeria. It considers how Nigeria responded 
to the plights of victims of in the Niger-Delta region of the country through the rehabilitation 
programme for youth militants within the region of the country as a measure with reparative 
effects. It also examines the case of Ken Saro Wiwa under the Alien Tort Claims Act before a 
US court.  
4.2 Reparations 
4.2.1. The Legal Framework 
Reparations as a transitional justice mechanism entail recognising and addressing the harm 
caused by human rights violations. It is a form of transitional justice which is often perceived 
as ‘repairing the past’ and having potentially direct impact on victims of human rights 
violations. Reparations publicly affirm that victims of human rights abuses are rights-holders 
                                                 
1‘General Comment No. 3 (2012) Implementation of Article 14 by States’ Parties’ 13 Dec. 2012- CAT/C/GE/3, 
para. 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
entitled to redress and as such this form of redress could take different forms.
2
 Reparations 
are not limited to monetary compensation as it is widely perceived they may also take other 
forms as has been recognised inter alia by the UN.
3
 Five different forms of reparations have 
been recognised which include restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and 
guarantee of non-occurrence.
4
 In this sense 
‘restitution aims to re-establish to the extent that is possible the situation that existed before 
the violations took place; compensation relates to any economically assessable damage 
resulting from the violation; rehabilitation include legal medical and psychological and other 
care; satisfaction and guarantee of non-repetition relate to measure to acknowledge the 
violation and prevent the recurrence in the future’5 
There is an extensive debate as to the existence of a general right to reparation for human 
rights violations. The growing consensus among authors is that victims of human rights 
violations are entitled to reparations based on the provisions of various international human 
rights conventions.
6
 These conventions provide for the right to compensation for certain 
human rights violations such as torture,
7
 false conviction,
8
 unlawful arrest or detention.
9
 In 
addition, a general right to reparation is inferred from Article 2 of the ICCPR which provides 
for the right of victims to effective remedy which could be determined by competent judicial 
administrative or legislative or any other competent state authority. The UN Human Rights 
                                                 
2
 ICTJ-Reparations Available at http://ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-issues/reparations (accessed 
October 2013). 
3
 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law A/RES/60/147 
adopted 21 March 2006 of the UN General Assembly. 
4
 De Greiff P ‘Justice and Reparation’ in De Greiff P (ed.) Handbook of Reparation (2006) 452. 
5
 Onyebula S ‘Reparation Policy in Nigeria’ in Doxtader E and Villa-Vicencio C (eds.) To Repair the 
Irreparable: Reparation and Reconstruction in South Africa (2004) 401- 402. 
6
 De Greiff (2006) 455. 
7
 Article 14 (1) Torture Convention. 
8
 Article 14 (6) ICCPR. 
9
 Article 9 (5) ICCPR. 
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Committee stated that without reparations to victims of human rights violations, the 
obligation to provide effective remedy may not be discharged.
10
 
The idea that there is a right to reparations, suggests that there is a corresponding duty to 
provide reparations to victims of human rights violations where necessary. While the focus of 
this paper is not on the debate on a general right to reparations as such, it suffices to say that 
reparative measures taken by any government in respect of victims of human rights 
violations, especially where such is accompanied by the work of a truth commission, is 
important in confronting and redressing the past. The fact that it is impossible to provide 
reparations for all victims does not deny that victims of gross human rights violations in fact 
have the right to reparations neither does it abdicate the responsibility to provide reparations 
for victims within the realms of possibility.  
Nigeria’s domestic laws provide for the right of victims to reparations for gross violation of 
human rights. The right to reparations is based on both constitutional provisions and 
international obligations
11
 which guarantees the right of a victim to redress for human rights 
violation. Such redress can be monetary compensation or any order the court deems fit 
considering the extent of injury suffered by the victim.
12
 Remedies are also available for 
tortuous acts in form of assault and battery under civil proceedings. 
                                                 
10
 General Comment No. 31(2004) on the Nature of the general legal obligation imposed on states parties to the 
ICCPR par.16 246. 
11
  Apart from the provisions of international legal instruments referred to above, Nigeria also has an obligation 
to recognise the rights of a victim to reparations under Article 8 Universal Declaration of Human Rights which 
provides rights of victims to effective remedy for violations of fundamental human rights guaranteed by the 
constitution or law of a state. 
12
 Chap IV of the 1999 Constitution; Onyegbula (2004) 403. 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
4.2.2 The Practice of Reparations in Nigeria 
At the outset, the aim of the successive government was towards truth finding and 
reconciliation. It gave little or no thought to focusing on the victims of past abuses.
13
 The 
HRVIC, however, devoted a whole chapter of its report to reparations for victims of past 
human rights abuses in Nigeria.
14
 Victims who had appeared before the panel particularly 
expressed their need for reparations. Therefore, the report included an appendix for such 
demand for reparations.
15
 The HRVIC also proposed a policy framework for reparation of 
victims by the government.
16
 In this sense, it made specific recommendations for the 
establishment of a rehabilitation fund
17
 which should be supported to by beneficiaries of the 
military regimes and perpetrators of human rights violations.
18
 
These recommendations were completely ignored by the Obasanjo administration and 
accordingly no significant step was taken towards the reparation of victims. The president 
rather emphasized reconciliation, but made no reference to reparations. As regards the 
payment of monetary compensation to victims, he was even clearly opposed to it. In this 
sense he was reported to have stated that: 
‘I must however disabuse the mind of those who believe that every apology must be followed 
with monetary compensation for victims...’19 ‘Money is not the answer. How much can you 
give a man for the murder of his father?’20 
                                                 
13
 Onyegbula (2004) 405. 
14
 Petitioners had applied to the HRVIC for reparations. HRVIC Report: Reparations Restitution and 
Compensation 74; HRVIC Report: Summary Conclusion and Recommendations 75. 
15
 HRVIC Report: Vol. 6, Reparation Restitution and Compensation 53. Similar needs were unanimously 
expressed by victims at the Seminar on the Rights to Compensation Rehabilitation and Restitution for Victims 
of gross Violation of Human Rights. Onyegbula (2004) 407.  
16
 HRVIC Report: Vol. 6, 46. 
17
 HRVIC Report: Vol. 7 Summary Conclusion and Recommendations, 55. 
18
 HRVIC Report: Vol. 6, 51. 
19
 A speech by Obasanjo at the 2001 World Conference on Racism in Durban South Africa as quoted in 
Onyegbula (2004) 405. 
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It is apposite to state here that although reparations can never fully compensate for the 
suffering and losses of victims, it constitutes an important acknowledgement of victims 
whose rights have been violated and without it there may never be real healing and 
reconciliation.
21
  
4.2.3. Reparative Measures for Human Rights Violation in the Niger-Delta 
region 
 Though the successive democratic government was clearly against monetary compensations 
for victims, the situation in the Niger Delta region deserves special attention since it has 
drawn both national and international attention over the years. 
Background to Human Rights Violations in the Niger-Delta 
The Niger-Delta region had been the scene of the worst human rights violations perpetrated 
by the military at the instance multinational oil companies such as Royal Dutch Shell 
operating under the name ‘Shell Nigeria’.22 Agitations against human rights violations in the 
region heightened after the summary execution of the Ken Saro Wiwa and the Ogoni-Nine. 
This led to a violent eruption of militancy by youths acting under the auspices of different 
groups in the region.
23
 As a result, the region soon became known as a restive region in the 
country witnessing violent attacks by the military and reprisals by the militant groups.
24
  
Different groups began to evolve with different agendas and aims of protesting against 
human rights violations. Such groups as the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger-Delta 
 
(MEND), the Movement for the Survival of Ijaw Ethnic Nationality in the Niger-Delta 
                                                                                                                                                        
20
 Vanguard Newspaper 23 May 2002 Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200205230656.html (accessed 
October 2013). 
21
 Onyegbula (2004) 412. 
22
 See Ch. 2. 
23
 Claude E and Welche Jnr ‘The Ogoni and Self-Determination: Increasing Violence in Nigeria’ (1995) The 
Journal of Modern African Studies Vol.33 No.4 642. 
24
 Human Rights Watch 4 Aug. 1999. Available at http://www.hrw.org/news/1999/08/03/current-human-rights-
concerns-nigeria (accessed October 2013). 
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(MOSIEND) and the Movement for the Reparation of Ogbia (MORETO) emerged drawing 
on the structure and operation of MOSOP.
25
 These groups possessed sophisticated arms with 
which they carried out criminal activities such as kidnappings and attacks on oil companies’ 
facilities in reprisal against incursion into the region by the military. Attempts by the military 
government to quell the violence proved abortive. While the militants may not be absolved of 
responsibility for certain crimes in the region, it has to be noted that also the military 
perpetrated egregious human rights violations in the region. Extrajudicial killings, torture, 
abduction and forced disappearances were most prevalent in the region. Victims from this 
region especially the Ogoni people had testified before the HRVIC on the human rights 
violations in the region and made demands on reparations.
26
 
Militant actions in the region continued after transition to a democratic regime in 1999. 
Rather than making attempts to resolve the crises in the region, the government deployed 
military officers to the region who perpetrated more human rights violations through 
repressive force and extrajudicial killings.
27
 Obasanjo’s administration acquiesced to the 
human rights violations perpetrated by military troops sent to the region while the crises 
lasted his administration. Increased militancy posed more threat to the security of Nigeria and 
the multinational oil companies and oil production in the region thus raising serious national 
concerns.  
                                                 
25
 Goldthau A (ed.) The Handbook of Global Energy Policy (2013) 511. On MOSOP see Ch. 2.  
26
 HRVIC Report Vol. 4 Case-by-Case Record of Public Hearing Chap. 4. 
27
 Human Rights Watch Dec.14 2000. Available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2000/12/14/update-human-rights-
violations-niger-delta 
(accessed October 2013). 
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However in 2009, the Yar’adua’s government offered general ‘amnesty’28 to the militants in 
the regions in return for surrendering of weapons by the militants.
29
 The amnesty was 
designed in three phases, the disarmament as the first face while rehabilitation and 
reintegration programmes were designed as the second and third phases for the militants who 
accepted amnesty.
30
 The amnesty offer subsisted for three months during which disarmament 
of militants took place at an arms collection centre and the collection of their biometrics data. 
The main focus of this section is the rehabilitation programme which is considered in the 
light of transitional justice. 
Rehabilitation of the Niger-Delta Militants 
A presidential Amnesty Committee was inaugurated by the president to work on the 
receiving of arms by the militants after the president signed the amnesty provisions. It was 
reported that 10 billion naira (62.5 million US Dollars) was approved by the National 
Assembly as budget for the rehabilitation programme. By the expiration of the period for the 
amnesty offer, over 26, 000 militants had laid down their arms and received the amnesty and 
hundreds of thousands of explosives and ammunitions had been recovered. Each militant was 
promised the payment of 65,000 naira (just a little above 400 US Dollars) monthly, the 
payment of a rent and vocational training. Militants were camped in designated places in the 
region where they were expected to undergo the rehabilitation which involve training on non-
violence and career development. 
                                                 
28
 The word ‘amnesty’ as used here refers to the term as used by the Nigerian government and does not 
necessarily represent the meaning of ‘amnesty’ as understood normally in international law especially in the 
context of transitional justice. As regards non-prosecutions of perpetrators see Ch. 3. 
29
 The Guardian Newspaper - 6 August 2009 Available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/06/niger-delta-militants-amnesty-launched (accessed October 
2013). 
30
 UNHCR website http://www.refworld.org/docid/50740a192.html.  Voice of America – 12 May 2010. 
Available at http://www.voanews.com/content/butty-nigeria-niger-delta-rehabilitation-alaibe-13may10-
93650634/154454.html (accessed October 2013). 
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After the rehabilitation programme, they were integrated into the society through vocational 
training, formal education or skills acquisition in Nigeria or outside the country depending on 
the interest of the ex-militant. Such training could take a minimum of six months to five years 
depending on the choice of training by the ex-militant. The rehabilitation and re-integration 
programme is expected to end in 2015. A cursory look at the amnesty programme reveals a 
successful outcome of the programme thus far. It has been successful in addressing violence 
in the region which had erupted as a result of failure of successive governments to address the 
plights of victims in the region. However a deeper examination unveils challenges and 
shortcomings of the programme. 
Overall, the rehabilitation has thus far been successful in achieving relative peace in the 
Niger-Delta region. It may not be clear what the aftermath of the programme will be since the 
programme is still subsisting. What stand out clear is that government could engage other 
forms or reparative measures apart from monetary compensation where there is a political 
will to do so.  
Restitution and rehabilitation programme may be engaged especially when considered in the 
light of specific request by victims who appeared before the HRVIC who demanded nothing 
more than restitution. The release of political prisoners and bodies of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the 
Ogoni-nine to their families after transition did constitute restitution to the victims’ families 
which had reparative effect. The request of the families that the trial and conviction of the 
Ogoni-nine be quashed in furtherance of restitution which had been repeatedly turned down 
could be reviewed as well as other wrongful summary trial and convictions of the military 
regimes. 
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A more comprehensive rehabilitation programme may be designed based on the 
recommendations of the HRVIC. The anticipated challenges with this apart from the financial 
implication are selection of victims and the assessment of and balancing claims of victims to 
reparations. These could be dealt with where a proper reparations committee is established as 
a follow up on the work of the HRVIC.  
4. 3 Transnational Civil Litigation for Reparation 
One of the ways reparative measures may also be achieved is through civil litigation. This is 
recognised by both international and Nigerian legal provision.
31
 Though the focus of this 
paper is not on the analysis of this form of reparation, it is worthy of note as one of the 
reparative measures which has been engaged in the Nigerian context. 
4.3.1 The Case of Shell and Ken Saro Wiwa under the US Alien Tort Act  
International oil companies operate in joint venture with the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) in oil production activities. Shell Nigeria has four subsidiaries in 
Nigeria part of which is Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC).
32
 SPDC being one 
of the foremost international oil companies operating in the region and accounting for 30% of 
the oil production in the Nigeria
33
 bore a great responsibility for many of the human rights 
violations in the country, including the popular extra-judicial killing of Ken Saro Wiwa and 
the Ogoni-nine.
34
 Oil production was in defiance of the rights of many inhabitants of the 
region, depriving them of their means of livelihood which are mainly fishing and farming, 
                                                 
31
 See notes 11 and 12 above. 
32
 Royal Dutch Shell as the parent company is incorporated in the UK and has its headquarters in the 
Netherlands. 
33
 SPDC website Available at http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/at-a-glance.html (accessed October 2013). 
34
 See Ch. 2. Lambooy T and Rancourt M ‘Shell in Nigeria: From Human Rights Abuse to Corporate Social 
Responsiblity’ (2008) 229 Human Rights and International Legal Discourse 241. 
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through environmental pollution.
35
 Shell was reported to have requested national security for 
protection of their operation in the region from the Abacha military government. It had co-
operated with the Abacha regime financially and furnishing military equipment and arms 
used by the military to brutally suppress the activities of the indigenes against the violation.
36
 
Following the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa, his family fled the country and instituted legal 
proceedings against Royal Dutch Shell under the provisions of the US Alien Tort Claim Act 
1789 for complicity in the human rights violations perpetrated by the military regimes.
37
 
Earlier in 1996, at the request of the Nigerian government the UN had conducted a fact-
finding mission to examine the summary execution of Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues based 
on the Nigerian law and international human rights obligations. The UN concluded that 
Nigeria had violated human rights obligations under national and international human rights 
laws. 
In November 1996 the suit was filed in a New York district court against Shell and additional 
two cases were instituted by the Wiwa family in Wiwa V. Anderson and Wiwa V. Shell 
Nigeria in 2001 and 2004 respectively and collectively referred to as Wiwa V. Shell. The US 
Courts had to make several decisions on preliminary issues as to the jurisdiction of the court 
to hear the matter before hearing the substantive suit.
38
  After more than ten years of 
protracted litigation, in 2009, Shell agreed to pay 15.5 million US Dollars in compensation to 
the claimants in an out of court settlement. 
                                                 
35
 Human Rights Watch Aug. 4 1999. Available at http://www.hrw.org/news/1999/08/03/current-human-rights-
concerns-nigeria (accessed October 2013). 
36
 See note 34 above. 
37
 Allegations against Shell include participation in crimes against humanity, torture summary execution and 
arbitrary detention. 
38
 Han X ‘The Wiwa Cases’ (2010) 9 No. 2 Chinese Journal of International Law 440. 
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4.3.2 National Civil Litigation 
Based on the national legal provisions, class actions have been brought on behalf of victims 
of human rights violations from the Niger-Delta region. These people have suffered from the 
activities of oil companies in the recording large number of deaths as a result of the 
environmental damage caused in the region. In all, there has been no successful outcome in 
achieving compensation to victims of such gross human rights violations on of such case is 
that of Shell V. Ijaw Aborigines of Bayelsa State
39
. 
In a public hearing in 2003, the National Assembly of Nigeria (NA) awarded 1.5 billion US 
dollars to the Ijaw community as damages in compensation for injuries suffered and 
environmental degradation of the claimant communities against Shell.
40
 The Ijaw Community 
is one of the communities which make up the Niger-Delta region of the country. The 
Community approached the Federal High Court (FHC) for enforcement of the order. When 
Shell refused to pay, the FHC affirmed the decision of the NA against Shell in 2006. 
However Shell still refused to pay and appealed against the decision at the Court of Appeal 
(CA).
41
 The case is still pending before the CA and its outcome is highly unpredictable. 
4.4. Symbolic Reparations and Public Apology 
The HRVIC proposed in its recommendation that former military presidents publicly 
apologise for the human rights abuse perpetrated during the regime.
42
 The president, who had 
also been a former military president, on 29 May 2002, offered a public apology for the 
                                                 
39
 Unreported. Available at http://desertherald.wordpress.com/2012/04/01/shell-ijaw-threaten-fresh-attacks-
over-1-5bn-judgmentdebt/ (accessed October 2013). 
40
 The compensation arose for oil spill in the community in 1994 caused by the activities of Shell Nigeria in the 
region which resulted in the death of about 1500 aborigines. 
41
 Daily Trust Newspaper 22 December 2011- Available at All Africa: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201112220748.html (accessed October 2013). 
42
 HRVIC Report: Summary Recommendation and Conclusion 16; Reparation Restitution and Compensation 
49. 
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misdeeds of past political administrations of the country. He re-named May 29, which had 
earlier been named ‘Democracy Day’, as ‘Democracy and Human Rights Day’ to annually 
commemorate the return to civilian regime in 1999. In his speech he laid down: 
“I, as chief executive of the federation, and being at the pinnacle of leadership in the country, 
am prepared to accept that the proverbial buck of the blame stops at my desk,... I therefore 
wish to offer my full apology to all Nigerians in general, and to direct victims in particular, 
for all misdeeds and transgressions perpetrated in time and in the course of our evolution as a 
nation and a society which, by omission or commission, have caused unwarranted suffering to 
individual and groups alike, marred our relationships within the society, and retarded the 
progress and development of the nation.”43 
As important as this act by the president was at the time, it was rendered nugatory by 
subsequent actions of the government especially with regards to the refusal to publish the 
report of the HRVIC or even attempt to implement its recommendations. 
4.5 Lustration 
Right from the beginning of the transitory government of Abubakar, a purge of the military 
had begun. This included the retirement of Abacha’s aides, and during transition to a civilian 
rules several other military officers who had served during Abacha regime also resigned. In 
his inaugural speech as president on 29 May 1999 Obasanjo stated that 
‘as a retired officer, my heart bleeds to see the degradation in the proficiency of the military. 
A great deal of reorientation has to be undertaken” including “retraining and re-education  …. 
to ensure that the military submits to civil authority and regains its pride, professionalism and 
traditions.’ 
 
                                                 
43
 Daily Champion 29 May 2002. Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200205290328.html (accessed 
October 2013). 
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About a hundred of senior military officers who served as ministers or military governors 
since 1985 were removed from their positions.
44
  It was perceived that the officers would 
remain threat to the country’s budding democracy as such they could not be allowed to 
continue to retain their offices.  
The government, however, stated that the retirement did not amount to allegations against the 
retired officers but was simply to ‘guarantee the survival of democracy in Nigeria’. This 
explanation was in line with general perception that if the officers were allowed to retain their 
offices there would be no deterrence from the possibility of coup attempts in the future. Thus, 
the retirements were seen as an important signal that military rule may be finally over in 
Nigeria. 
This act was clearly anticipated in the recommendations of the HRVIC which provided for 
reforms in the military, the police and a drastic reduction of the armed forces.
45
  While many 
Nigerians laud this act, it was also widely criticised among the ‘Northern’ as a prejudicial act 
against the military officers from the Northern part of the country many of whom had been 
part of the past military regime. 
This perception is highly unfounded as the criteria of selection for retirement was active 
participation in past military regimes which in did not relate to the region of the country 
where the officer belonged. The process, however, did not apply to all the military officers 
who were associated with the previous military regimes as some of the old military officers 
still played active roles in government after transition. 
                                                 
44
 BBC News 11 June 1999 Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/366259.stm (accessed October 2013). 
45
 HRVIC Report: Reparation Restitution and Compensation 51; Recommendations and Conclusion page 41, 72. 
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4.6 Evaluation 
The Wiwa cases though regarded as a landmark in achieving redress for victims of human 
rights violations by multinational companies, were fraught with challenges. The cases did not 
proceed to full trial on its merit before the out-of-court settlement between the two parties 
and left some legal issues unresolved.
46
 It is however apposite to state that it is considerably a 
successful reparative measure for the Wiwa family especially since no reparative measure 
was taken by the Nigerian government in that respect. However, the focus of this section is 
on the rehabilitation programme which is a relatively recent development and the specific 
focus of this chapter. 
First, there has been no general reparative measure undertaken by the Nigerian government in 
respect of victims of human rights violations of the military regimes. The rehabilitation 
programme analysed in this chapter was initiated independent of earlier recommendations by 
the HRVIC, and might have only been successful in curbing violence in the region rather than 
actually providing reparations for victims of human rights violations. The rehabilitation 
programme was introduced to end militant activities in the region and in the process to 
redirect the cause of the militants to engage in productive activities. Thus, it is arguable 
whether the rehabilitation programme was designed to actually ‘repair the harm’ committed 
in the Niger-Delta region. Generally, one of the criticisms against reparations when pursued 
independently of other transitional justice measures is that it may be regarded as buying 
victims over.
47
 In the case of the rehabilitation programme, this was the general perception by 
other victims who did not benefit from the programme which was only extended to Niger-
                                                 
46
 Han X (2010) 448. Han argues that the judgement may not have been satisfactory had it been based on the full 
trial of the case, given the existing international environmental law framework and the human rights law 
position on environmental rights. 
47
 De Greiff P ‘Theorising Transitional Justice’ in Williams M et al. (eds.) Transitional Justice (2012) 37. 
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Delta militants. While this position is highly plausible, the programme had an indirect 
reparative effect for some of the victims in the region.  
Second, reparative claims have been made by victims under various national legal provisions. 
Victims who sought relief under national laws for reparation, have been largely unsuccessful 
because of the unwillingness to pay monetary compensation which is the most sought form of 
reparation. The rehabilitation programme for the Niger-Delta militants undertaken by the 
government have not addressed the actual victims of the human rights violations of the 
military regimes. The programme rather than been a reparative measure for victims, appears 
to be an attempt to permanently quell violence in the region. The ‘amnesty’ proffered for the 
militants makes them appear more as perpetrators and not necessarily victims of human rights 
violations. This has not addressed the need for reparations of the real victims of human rights 
violations. 
In addition, judicial remedies for victims of human rights violations in form of monetary 
compensation have not been effective. Victims who have approached the Nigerian Courts to 
seek relief under the constitutional provisions have met disappointment and frustration. This 
clearly explains the reason the option of the US ATCA was explored by Saro-Wiwa’s family. 
Such claims if pursued under the national legal provision would not only have been 
unsuccessful, but also a sheer waste of time. Apart from the fact that such reparative 
measures could not be sought in Nigeria at the time the case was instituted in the US because 
the military regime was still operative in Nigeria, it is unlikely that the case would have been 
admitted by or heard in Nigerian Courts.  
Generally, one of the challenges of the designing of a reparative programme is the difficulty 
in deciding who of the victims will be recipients of such programme. In this regard, it is often 
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difficult to clearly distinguish between gross human rights violations and moral general 
features of a repression.
48
 Victims of human rights violations have been defined as persons 
who have individually or collectively suffered harm from serious violations of international 
human rights law or humanitarian law.  Such harm could be physical, mental, emotional, 
economic or substantial impairment of the rights of the victims. Victims could also include 
immediate family or dependent of the direct victims or persons who have suffered harm in 
intervening or assisting victims in distress or prevent victimisation.
49
  
In the light of the above provision the militants for whom the programme was designed could 
be regarded as victims of human rights violations not only because many are direct victims of 
violations in the Niger-Delta region but also as immediate families of direct victims. This, 
however, does not dismiss the fact that the beneficiary militants were a ‘mixed multitude’ of 
real victims and ‘opportunist’ who just wanted to take advantage of the programme.  
While it is admitted that beneficiaries of the rehabilitation programme are militants drawn 
from families of victims of human rights violations in the region, the process of selection of 
beneficiaries was not so well defined. This is especially true in the light of the 
recommendations of the HRVIC. Recommendations on reparations were borne out of proper 
interviews with the victims of human rights violations of the Military regimes and further 
recommendations were made on designing comprehensive reparation packages for victims.
50
 
The rehabilitation programme, however, may not have been borne out of a refined process. 
There were reports that some of the militants did not accept the ‘amnesty’ because there was 
                                                 
48
 Doxtader E and Villa-Vicencio C (eds.) (2004) 10. 
49
 Article 8 - UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims (see note 
3 above). 
50
 HRVIC Report: Vol. 6 50. 
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no proper dialogue between the militant groups and the Nigerian government and as a result 
there were threats by militants to resume activities.
51
 More so the programme only addresses 
the Niger-Delta and not victims of human rights violations in the country in general. Other 
victims who had been at the hearing of the HRVIC and made demands for reparations have 
not been addressed rather much of the focus has been on the Niger-delta. In addition, the 
issue of selectivity of victims itself may be a source of re-victimisation in the sense that 
victims perceive it as ranking their suffering as more or less important to others.  
The agitations of the victims of human rights abuses in the region had always been towards 
abatement of the human rights abuses and effective remedy for the damages suffered in the 
region. Such effective remedy lies not necessarily in any retributive measures against 
perpetrators of human rights violations as much as in some form of compensation for the 
damages suffered by the victims and guarantee of non-repetition of such human rights 
violations. The programme may not have achieved this for victims in the region. There are 
reports of human rights violations in the region after the launching of the programme and as a 
result militants have threatened to resume activities in the region. 
Overall, given the background of human rights violations in Nigeria and the wide range of 
victims who can rightfully claim reparations the wide gap between the practical realities of 
transitional societies and reparative responsibilities is once again presented. Thus, while the 
need for reparative measure cannot be denied, there must be a well-defined policy framework 
for reparations, otherwise fragmentary efforts such as that of the rehabilitation programme 
may just end up benefiting only a few victims while ‘re-victimising’ others. 
                                                 
51
 IRIN- Analysis Niger-Delta Still Unstable After Amnesty. 
Available at http://www.irinnews.org/report/94306/analysis-niger-delta-still-unstable-despite-amnesty 
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4.7 Conclusions 
While it is impracticable for any government to provide direct compensation for every victim 
of gross human right violation, Nigeria has not undertaken any comprehensive reparations 
programme in respect of victims of human rights abuses of past regimes. The rehabilitation 
programme has not only been inadequate but highly fragmentary and sectional. Even the 
rehabilitation programme has not achieved much because of the persistence of violence in the 
region as a result of prolonged human rights violations in the region. It is clear from the 
Nigerian example that reparative measures undertaken without a guarantee of non-recurrence 
of the actions which occasioned the damages in the first place is more or less ineffective. 
Nigeria has not only failed to discharge the duty to prosecute the past human rights 
violations, but has also done little in confronting the past in other ways, leaving victims of 
such violations with no remedy either. 
Thus, the light of the work and recommendations of the HRVIC where victims were more 
disposed to reparative measures than punitive sanctions against perpetrators, and international 
provision on the right of victims to reparations, Nigeria has equally failed in its obligations. 
Given the circumstances and the degree of violations of human rights in the country, more 
reparative measures should be pursued and such measures should not be limited to a 
particular region of the country in neglect of others. 
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Chapter Five - Conclusions and Recommendations 
 ‘Only by interweaving, sequencing and accommodating multiple pathways to justice could 
some kind of larger justice in fact emerge.’ 
 – Roht Arriaza N
1
 
5.1 Introduction 
The effectiveness of transitional justice measures is largely determined by the context of the 
society in which they are applied and the political will of the transitional society. Transitional 
justice efforts may be continuous as a new government replaces another and the political 
context changes. It is therefore essential to adopt a long term perspective of transitional 
justice.
2
 The Nigerian government since democratic dispensation in 1999, though having 
made some attempts in this regard, has shown no real commitment to redressing past human 
right abuses. Given Nigeria’s long history of repression and gross human right violations, 
attempts at redressing the past have not been effective. 
This chapter proposes a renewed attempt at confronting the past and redressing human right 
violations of the military regimes in Nigeria in line with obligations under international legal 
instruments and national domestic provisions. 
5.2 Conclusions 
From the foregoing chapters it is established that Nigeria has made attempts to confront the 
legacy of human rights violations of the past military regimes engaging both retributive and 
restorative forms of justice.  
                                                 
1
 Roht-Arriaza N & Mariezcurrena Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century (2006) 8 
2
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With regards to retributive justice, Nigeria has made rather specious attempts to prosecute a 
few alleged perpetrators of human rights violations of the military regime. It has, however, 
failed in this respect to effectively discharge its duty to prosecute as recognised by 
international legal instruments under which Nigeria owes an obligation. The major 
perpetrators identified by the HRVIC have neither been further investigated nor prosecuted. 
Prosecutions thus far have been highly selective, fraught with challenges and largely 
unsuccessful. Trials initiated against alleged perpetrators have been dismissed by the Courts 
for lack of sufficient evidence; even where a conviction was obtained it has been quashed by 
the Court of Appeal. 
Thus, no single perpetrator has been criminally held liable for the human rights abuses of the 
military regimes. No proper investigations have been launched with respect to cases which 
were referred to the Inspector-General by the HRVIC. Most importantly, the report of the 
HRVIC, which had been put in place by the government itself, has not been officially 
acknowledged and its recommendations with respect to prosecution of named alleged 
perpetrators have been consistently ignored by each successive government. The perpetrators 
or their ‘agents’ permeate almost every sector of the Nigerian government thus, there is no 
willingness to prosecute perpetrators. As much as this cannot be an excuse for lack of 
prosecutions it is a real threat and challenge to achieving justice for victims of human rights 
violations. 
In the line of restorative justice, the right of victims of human rights violations to reparation 
have been denied. At least after a long neglect of the recommendations of the HRVIC in 
respect of reparations, a rehabilitation programme was designed for the Niger-Delta region in 
2009. The programme apart from focusing on the Niger-Delta region only and neglecting 
victims from other parts of the country did not address the real victims of human rights 
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violation but was rather directed at militants in the region in order to quell violence. This, in 
no way, constitutes a reparative measure for victims of human right violations of the past 
military regimes. There has been no comprehensive reparative programme for victims of 
human rights violations. The HRVIC recommendations on reparations have been confined to 
the paper and rendered insignificant. Victims identified for reparations have not even been 
acknowledged and their rights to reparations under international and domestic legal 
provisions hold no sway in Nigeria. 
In sum, Nigeria’s attempts at confronting the past have been inadequate, ineffective and can 
be best described as a farce. Nigeria has only successfully tucked away the past rather than 
confronting it and this may have encouraged human rights violations across the country. It is 
quite plausible to consider the new outbreaks of violence in the Northern part of the country 
and the resurgence of violence in the Niger-Delta region of the country as a consequence of 
the absence of prosecutions. ‘Widespread impunity for perpetrators encourages abuses and 
institutionalises them.’ 3 
5.3 Recommendations: Towards a more effective Transitional Justice in 
Nigeria 
In the light of the above, Nigeria must re-examine its stance in order to successfully confront 
the legacies of human rights violations of the past military regimes. Transition justice 
requires a holistic approach which incorporates both retributive and restorative measures. 
Such integrated approach should engage the victims whose rights have been violated. 
First, there must be an official acknowledgement and publication of the report of the HRVIC 
in order to set the country in the right direction towards transitional justice. The whole 
                                                 
3
 Nigeria: Time for Justice and Accountability Amnesty International (2000)16 Available at 
www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR44/014/2000 (accessed October 2013). 
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transitional justice effort revolves around the truth telling process. The whole process is 
defeated and worthless without an extensive implementation of the recommendation of the 
Commission. 
Recommendations of the Commission with respect to prosecutions should be revisited. In this 
respect, major perpetrators of the human rights violations of the military regimes should be 
brought to trial. The challenges of finding evidence notwithstanding, where a proper 
investigation is conducted sufficient evidence can be gathered in respect of the cases against 
the major perpetrators. Prosecutorial discretion should not be subject to the whims and 
caprices of any government in power. The judiciary should be totally independent of 
influences from other arms of government. The essence of prosecution is not limited to 
individual accountability for past misdeeds, it also achieves justice for the victims of the 
human rights violations. While prosecution of perpetrators of human rights violations will 
never revoke the wrong done, it is indispensable for healing the moral wounds of the victims 
and their relatives.
 
 
Second, while prosecutions play an important role in ensuring criminal accountability for 
human rights violations, the Nigerian context requires well-defined reparations programme 
for victims. The reparations may leave open the option to pursue individual reparations 
through civil litigation since it is unlikely that such reparations programme will cater for 
every victim of human rights violations. Given the challenges of designing a reparations 
programme and the practical impossibility of granting monetary compensation to every 
victim, the recommendations of the HRVIC plays an important role in designing and 
implementing a comprehensive reparative programme. 
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Reparations in form of compensation and rehabilitation demands a lot of financial 
commitment by the government and such commitment has to be carefully planned out and 
such may be a one-off payment. Reparations, however, need not focus on monetary 
compensation alone. Reparations programme may focus on other aspects such as 
rehabilitations as recommended by the HRVIC 
Overall, truth telling without reparations or prosecutions and making the truth told public, in 
the end, makes the victims’ account meaningless. 
Word Count: 19,495 (Excluding preliminary pages and Bibliography). 
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